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 4 
Abstract 
 
Putting Phenomenology into Practice – Towards an Ontology of 
Person Centered Healthcare 
 
In this research I have set out a philosophical basis for person centered 
healthcare. I have uncovered the philosophical ground on which this rests 
in an attempt to show how practice can be improved, and how examples 
of person centered practice can be transferred between individuals and 
institutions involved in the commissioning and provision of healthcare. 
Philosophy is the instrument through which we understand why systems 
work and philosophy is therefore the key to unlock the potential of person 
centered healthcare. By providing an underlying architectonic this work will 
help to enable practitioners to understand the benefits of person centered 
healthcare practice in promoting autonomy in those who are suffering from 
chronic and other illnesses.  
 
I have used the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics to provide support to the argument in 
favour of a person centered approach to healthcare. Phenomenology offers 
a rich and subtle way of thinking about how we know what we know, and 
this applies to our knowledge and understanding of how healthcare works 
just as much as it does to all other kinds of knowledge. Existential 
phenomenology, with its emphasis on the first person lived experience of 
people who are ill and receiving care provides a method of discussing, 
understanding and grounding person centered healthcare which is 
philosophically robust, and which offers policy makers, and those 
commissioning and providing healthcare, clear guidance on how to make 
their practice person centered.  
 
Using examples from my own experience of illness and healthcare along 
with account given by others I have shown how the purpose of healthcare 
is understood as the preservation, restoration and maximisation of 
personal autonomy, how a person centered approach is the most 
appropriate response to this purpose, and how the philosophical ground 
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which I have set out becomes manifest in the practice of person centered 
healthcare. 
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Putting Phenomenology into Practice – Towards an Ontology of 
Person Centered Healthcare 
 
Chapter One - Introduction 
 
You put the interests of people using or needing nursing or 
midwifery services first. You make their care and safety your 
main concern and make sure that their dignity is preserved and 
their needs are recognized, assessed and responded to. You 
make sure that those receiving care are treated with respect, that 
their rights are upheld and that any discriminatory attitudes and 
behaviours towards those receiving care are challenged.1 
 
You must be polite and considerate.  
You must treat patients as individuals and respect their dignity 
and privacy.  
You must treat patients fairly and with respect whatever their life 
choices and beliefs.  
You must work in partnership with patients, sharing with them the 
information they will need to make decisions about their care. 
You must support patients in caring for themselves to empower 
them to improve and maintain their health.2 
 
These are fine intentions from two United Kingdom professional bodies, 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council and the General Medical Council, from 
which we draw most of the people who look after us when we are unwell. 
It is interesting to reflect, even at this early stage of the discussion that, in 
the two codes of good practice, we seem to have what appears to be 
already a person, or at least patient, centered approach. We might in the 
circumstances be tempted to ask them to just “get on with it”. However, in 
neither of these admirable expressions of intent do we see any 
philosophical ground for the approach they recommend and without this 
we cannot be sure that the aims they intend will be delivered. It is also 
interesting to see that the code of good practice for nurses talks about 
“people” while the equivalent code for doctors refers to “patients”. This 
difference is repeated throughout the full text of these codes of practice 
and may well reflect underlying philosophical differences. These 
philosophical differences may begin to tell us, as we proceed with the 
argument, something about what it is to be a patient and what it is to be a 
person, and why this might be important when we consider how we are 
treated. 
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While the meaning in the codes of practice at first appears clear it becomes 
problematic the moment we begin to try to define. It feels as if we all think 
we know what we mean when it comes to person centered healthcare, but 
as soon as we discuss the subject our differences become more apparent 
than the commonality that we thought we all shared. Few, if anyone, would 
disagree with these fine intentions but the question as to what they really 
mean remains at best contentious and at worst unclear. We do not really 
understand what success looks like in respect of these intentions or how 
to devise systems which will guarantee their delivery in practice. This is a 
problem; and in order for these intentions to be put into widespread 
everyday practice we need to gain a deeper understanding of their 
intellectual origins and thereby to understand what we really mean. 
 
The policy context for person centred care in the United Kingdom is evident 
to anyone looking at the output of NHS England3 and other associated 
organisations, where a wide range of person centred care initiatives are 
being promulgated ranging from individual budgets for some patients with 
long term conditions to proposals to engage service users in the planning 
and design of services. This has also included the development of NHS 
sponsored organisations to promote person centred care like the Coalition 
for Collaborative Care which now sit alongside more independent 
organisations like the Health Foundation which is producing work intended 
to promote person centred care4 and the Point of Care Foundation.5 The 
output of all of these organisations, together with the work of professional 
bodies like the General Medical Council and the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council, sets the context for the development of person centred care in the 
United Kingdom.   
 
This is not the place to examine in detail the many initiatives that are being 
brought forward. For the purposes of this work it is sufficient to say that in 
the United Kingdom Health Service the idea of person centred care is 
receiving large amounts of attention and work but without the benefit of a 
robust philosophical understanding of the notion itself, which is what I 
propose to offer in this work. As a philosopher it is not for me to evaluate 
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or criticise any of the current initiatives which are intended to promote or to 
use a person centered approach, as a philosopher my primary intent is to 
use the insights offered by philosophy to understand the intellectual 
territory and to offer clear thinking about the topics under discussion, with 
the intention that this clarity should provide those who make policy a firm 
basis on which to base their own work. This is the aim of this work. 
 
Why Philosophy? 
Philosophy is the instrument through which we understand why systems 
work because philosophy is argumentative, the more argumentative the 
better, 
 
It proceeds by way of arguments, and the arguments are argued 
over. Everything is aired in the bracing dialectic wind stirred by 
many clashing viewpoints. Only in this way can intuitions that have 
their source in societal or personal idiosyncrasies be exposed and 
questioned.6 
 
The purpose of philosophy is to unsettle us and to make us question 
ourselves, to make us unsure about what we think and do, and to 
constantly challenge ourselves in order to be the best we can. Neither can 
the power of philosophy be denied as Gadamer points out, 
 
for philosophy … I take care to tell my students: you must sharpen 
your ear, you must realize that when you take a word in your mouth, 
you have not taken up some arbitrary tool which can be thrown in 
a corner if it doesn’t do the job, but you are committed to a line of 
thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond you.7 
 
As the powerful process which concerns itself with looking into the 
presuppositions of arguments, and in creating consistent foundations for 
new positions and arguments, philosophy becomes the key to unlock the 
potential of person centered healthcare. This work will begin to uncover the 
philosophical basis of person centered care by a process of presenting and 
critically evaluating arguments which support a person centered approach 
to healthcare. This will then show both how practice can be improved and 
how examples of good practice in this area can be transferred between the 
individuals and institutions involved in the commissioning and provision of 
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healthcare. By establishing a robust philosophical basis for a person 
centered approach to healthcare those involved in the provision and 
commissioning of care will be provided with an intellectually consistent 
method with which they can achieve their aim of giving help to those who 
need it, and in the ways that they would like to have it given.  
 
Why person centered healthcare? 
The promotion of a person centered approach to the commissioning and 
provision of healthcare is stimulated from two quite different directions. The 
first is a deep rooted feeling that it is inappropriate to treat humans like 
ourselves as anything other than just that (whatever “that” might be). The 
second approach is more simply practical as a response to the increasing 
numbers of people in Western societies who are living with long lasting 
chronic illnesses, and who require care (sometimes only a little care, 
sometimes a lot) to live their lives. This creates a problem in that large 
numbers of people now require often expensive care to be provided by 
services, which in their turn consume more and more of the wealth of these 
societies. The question as to how these services are to be paid for 
becomes increasingly pressing. In a way this is a problem that is of our own 
creation. Not so long ago many of the conditions with which people now 
live well would have killed them quite quickly, diabetes and left side 
ventricular failure to name but two. Advances in medical technology have 
resulted in many of us living longer lives but without the benefit of perfect 
health (whatever that might be) and the question as to how to provide us 
with the care we need in the most cost efficient way becomes paramount 
and, so the argument goes, drives us in a person centered direction.8,9 
Supporters of a person centered approach to the commissioning and 
provision of this kind of care suggest that this approach offers a way of 
coping with large numbers of people who need care. By treating people as 
individuals and by tailoring the care they get to their individual needs they 
are helped to become more self-reliant and therefore less dependent on 
health and social care services. The shorthand for this case is “making 
patients into persons”, or to put it another way to avoid making persons into 
patients. Increased self-management by independent people who are 
 10 
living with illness reduces the pressure on health and social care services 
and makes these systems tenable. This second approach makes an 
appeal to the presumption that people who receive person centered care 
are made more confident, more independent and therefore less dependent 
on services. The theory that some kind of “health activation” produces long 
term benefits has begun to show that, by engaging with the everyday lives 
people who are unwell, systems and practitioners can improve outcomes 
and perhaps reduce costs.10,11,12 While this work makes a practical case for 
a person centered approach to healthcare it still rests on an unexamined 
presupposition about what constitutes person centered healthcare in the 
sense of an underlying relationship between those who provide care and 
those who receive it. 
 
The thing that both of these approaches have in common is that neither 
rests on any clarity of meaning as to what we understand as person 
centered care. The third approach and the one which I propose to develop 
in this work is that Being-with-Others is constitutive of the Being of each 
and every one of us. Not only do we live in a world with Others like 
ourselves but the being of these Others is so closely tied up with our own 
being that the relationship is mutually constitutive. In terms of healthcare 
this will lead us to the notion of authentic solicitude as the ground for the 
provision of care to Others when they are unwell. This approach, by 
showing the nature of the relationship of our own being to the being of 
Others, provides us with a strong reason why we should behave in the 
explicitly other regarding way that is manifested in person centered 
healthcare. It is the task of philosophy not to direct the decisions we make 
about the creation of values (to tell us what we ought to do) but to inform 
the choices we make. It is true that, even with this knowledge, we may 
choose to act in such ways that will jeopardise the necessary structures of 
our own Being, but it makes such choices less appealing and therefore less 
likely, and in this way, provides a more robust ground on which the 
advocates of person centered healthcare can make their arguments. 
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Phenomenology 
The philosophical method that I will primarily employ will be 
phenomenology, and specifically the existential ontological 
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Phenomenology offers a rich and 
subtle way of thinking about how we know what we know, and this applies 
to our knowledge and understanding of how healthcare works just as much 
as it does to all other kinds of knowledge. Phenomenology, with its 
emphasis on the first person lived experience of people who are ill and 
receiving care provides a method of discussing, understanding and 
grounding person centered healthcare which is philosophically robust, and 
which offers policy makers and those commissioning and providing 
healthcare clear guidance about how to make their practice, and their 
services, person centered. In effect phenomenology will give us an 
epistemology and an ontology of person centered healthcare. However, it 
is in the nature of phenomenology (and particularly the phenomenology of 
Heidegger) that it provides us with demonstrations rather than the kind of 
proofs that we might conventionally look for. The emphasis which this 
method places on first hand lived experience and the first-hand accounts 
of individuals means that to understand what is being said we need 
somehow to experience these demonstrations ourselves. In Heideggerian 
fashion the truth is to be revealed or unhidden13 and it will be directly 
related to the context we find ourselves in. When it comes to 
phenomenology we either “get it” or we don’t. This means that it takes a 
specific kind of (phenomenological) reflection, as found in the works not 
only of Heidegger and Gadamer but in writers like Sebald14, to appreciate 
what we can gain in understanding from our experience of the world, and 
the strength of the case can only be judged according to how successful it 
has been in helping us to gain this understanding.15 In view of this, in some 
of its aspects, this work will not only use the insights of phenomenology, 
but it will be phenomenological itself. To achieve this I will use examples of 
real life experience of healthcare to illuminate the philosophical 
architecture. By using anecdotes and personal examples I will show how 
phenomenology can illuminate our thinking about healthcare, all the way 
from the level of an encounter between an individual patient and a clinician 
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to the level of healthcare commissioning and large scale provision. This 
means that this work will be a combination of philosophical argument, first 
hand personal reflection (my own), and second hand personal reflection 
(the published reflections of others who have written about their own illness 
and the illness of others). We begin and end with our experience of care; 
this will result in an approach which recognises clear roles for everyone 
involved, including those who receive care, and puts their experience at 
the heart of everything we do. I will set out how people who are ill, individual 
practitioners, commissioners, and institutional providers can use a 
phenomenological approach to improve services, charting a route from 
philosophical theory into healthcare practice. Any piece of philosophy 
which does not set out to have an effect on the way that we behave is of 
very limited worth, and philosophy in the area of healthcare which makes 
no attempt to improve the experience of healthcare seems to me to be a 
pointless exercise. 
 
This approach is of particular interest to me not only as a philosopher with 
a special interest in Heideggerian phenomenology, but as someone who 
has experienced serious chronic illness while working as a senior manager 
in the United Kingdom National Health Service. My own reflections, on my 
own experience of being responsible for the delivery and development of 
services, combined with my later experience of being on the receiving end 
of services has supported the development of the ideas expressed in this 
thesis. To summarise, after working as a manger specialising in primary 
care for eighteen years I was forced to retire due to ill health (ulcerative 
colitis) in 2004, and in 2009 underwent surgery for the construction of an 
ileostomy. In a move similar to that described by Havi Carel in her work 
Illness16 I was able to us the insights given to me by the study of philosophy 
to understand what was happening to me and to recognise the value of my 
experience in gaining an understanding of the nature of illness and being 
unwell. My background in healthcare, philosophy and a as a patient has 
been valuable in the construction of this thesis. 
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Summary 
The work will proceed as follows. In the next section (Chapter Two) I will 
aim to provide a sound philosophical basis for the argument which will 
include a setting out of the nature of our relationship with those we call 
Others. For this we will need an outline of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
ontology and to show how he arrives at the equation; 
 
phenomenology = hermeneutics = ontology 
 
This equation will provide the philosophical basis for the entire argument 
and will be combined with the hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer17 to 
develop what I will call a hermeneutic of healthcare in which the healthcare 
system will be understood as the sum of all of the encounters between 
those who seek help with their health problems and those who offer this 
help. This means that the healthcare system has no fixed identity and is 
constantly in flux and changing. It also means that it is not describable by 
any conventional means. If we accept this understanding then we take a 
hermeneutic approach to our study of the philosophy of healthcare. Under 
this approach the details of the system (individual encounters) can only be 
understood in the context of the whole system and conversely the whole 
system can only be understood in relation to the details (individual 
encounters). We are therefore returned constantly to the individual 
encounter. In this chapter, by clarifying what we mean by the healthcare 
system and by gaining an understanding of what it is to be in a world with 
Others, I will prepare the ground on which a person centered approach to 
healthcare can be built in a way which is consistent with our fundamental 
ways of existing in the world. 
 
In Chapter Three I will argue that autonomy is the end of healthcare. Illness 
is experienced as the inability to do things that we have been used to doing; 
a gap opens up between our willed existence and our biological existence. 
We can no longer do the things that we want to do. In illness this is 
experienced as a sudden or relatively sudden loss of ability to act as we 
will, while in ageing the loss is more gradual and therefore less noticeable. 
In both cases the loss is, at bottom, a loss of personal autonomy. In the 
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case of illness, when this loss becomes more than we can manage, we 
consult someone with expertise in healthcare as a means of seeking the 
assistance we need to restore our previously experienced autonomy. Of 
course the notion of autonomy is not always simple, and I will discuss some 
of these complexities in this chapter, but It remains clear that while there 
are many varied and complex scenarios that occur every day in every 
healthcare system all of them, however complex and varied, conform in 
essence, to this basic analysis of loss and attempted restoration of 
autonomy.  
 
In Chapter Four I will consider in some detail the relationship between what 
it is to be a patient and what it is to be a person and why this matters. I will 
do this using a discussion of Heidegger’s notion of solicitude as our way of 
being-with-Others. This will also include a consideration of the dialectical 
relationship between clinicians and their patients and the idea of mutually 
informed consent. This in turn will lead to the setting out of the barriers to 
person centered healthcare and some of the ways that these may be 
overcome through the process of normalising care, as part of the process 
of restoring and maximising autonomy. 
 
In Chapter Five I will use the very personal reflections of Havi Carel18,19 
and Atul Gawande20 in a discussion of living well with illness and of dying 
well, and the ways that person centered care can make this easier. I have 
chosen these two authors because their work on illness is more than simply 
descriptive and anecdotal. Both provide the necessary philosophical 
reflections that are required to advance towards the development of a 
robust philosophical basis for person centered healthcare which is the aim 
of this thesis. In particular the combination of accounts of her personal 
experience and the philosophical grounding of this experience make 
Carel’s work both compelling and philosophically potent, and her use of 
Heideggerian existential phenomenological ontology allows her to extend 
her understanding of her own illness to a wider interpretation of what it is 
to be unwell. In the case of Gawande although the philosophical ground is 
not made quite so explicit his reflections on the cases he presents point 
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towards the same philosophical mechanisms that are used by Carel. I am 
aware that there are many other accounts of the experience of illness but 
within the confines of this thesis and its limited aims I am satisfied that 
these two, along with references to some of my own periods of serious 
illness are sufficient for the case to be made. 
In addition to using the work of Carel and Gawande in this chapter I will 
show how the ontology which I believe underpins person centered 
healthcare is revealed in the practice of end of life or palliative care.21 This 
will, not surprisingly, turn out to be a species of what is now termed holistic 
care, an expression more commonly heard in nursing circles than in those 
inhabited by doctors, but which has really been around for much longer 
than the terms we now use to give an account of this kind of care. It 
includes consideration and sympathy for others, respect for individuality, 
attending to the psychological and “spiritual” needs of patients and simply 
caring. Philosophically understood, these ways of caring, represent 
authentic being in the practice of healthcare. While this way of caring is 
perhaps most prominent in palliative care, I hope to show that it can be 
central to person centered care in the delivery of healthcare in all sectors. 
 
Chapter Six will conclude the work and show in summary why a person 
centered approach to the commissioning and provision of healthcare 
works, not only for those of us who need care but for those who organize 
and pay for it. The central importance of personal autonomy and self-
management will now be apparent as the most significant features of any 
system of person centered healthcare. I will refer briefly to two examples 
from my own experience; the first of coping with serious illness and the 
second of implementing a large clinical effectiveness programme in United 
Kingdom General Practice.22 My endeavour in this section will be show how 
the philosophical structures which I have shown to underlie person 
centered healthcare can be effective in the practice of commissioning and 
providing healthcare, and furthermore, how the lessons that we can learn 
from these examples, and from the philosophical approach that I have been 
using, can be applied in many other areas of healthcare. 
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Chapter Two - Phenomenology, Ontology, Hermeneutics 
 
If the question at issue is, “Why person centered care and not some other 
approach?”, then the answer I will first propose is that person centered care 
is a manifestation of fundamental ontology; that is, it is a function of what it 
means to be authentically human. To achieve this I will use Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology and Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach. The 
combination of existential phenomenological ontology and hermeneutics 
will provide a powerful basis for all of the succeeding arguments by re-
framing the case for person centered healthcare in terms of the first hand 
lived experience of those giving and receiving care, and by using an 
understanding of the healthcare system as a dynamic totality. This chapter 
will give an explanation of my use of the terms, phenomenology, ontology 
and hermeneutics and their relation to an understanding of healthcare. 
Once this is done I hope that I will have made the philosophical case for 
person centered healthcare clear and compelling. The nature of the 
methodology that I am using is such that I will be able to issue no 
categorical imperative in favour of person centered care. In fact this 
methodology challenges the very nature of such imperatives as we might 
expect to understand them. In what will be a fundamentally existential 
approach to an understanding of illness, and by implication healthcare, we 
will have no more than a demonstration of what constitutes effective 
healthcare rather than any kind of proof of the superior nature of person 
centered healthcare. Working with a Heideggerian notion of truth, as that 
which is revealed rather than truth as concerning the correctness of 
propositions,23 our interpretation will uncover the truth of illness and 
healthcare. Both Heidegger and Gadamer (and the others who use their 
work) do not seek to “prove”, their aim is an interpretation of everyday 
experience leading to understanding. In the context of healthcare this 
means an interpretation of the experience of illness and of receiving care, 
leading to an understanding of the meaning of healthcare, (“meaning” in 
this sense being equivalent to that which makes it possible). Although at 
times the argument may appear at best inconclusive this is simply in the 
nature of this kind of reasoning in that it is fundamentally based on and 
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concerned with our first hand lived experience of the world. This experience 
is not accessible to external validation by another consciousness, so it will 
still remain for us all to decide whether or not we accept these 
interpretations. 24  In the end I believe that philosophy can only move us 
forward in the direction of understanding, and that is what I intend to do 
here. 
 
Phenomenology 
Bachelard puts it lyrically when he describes phenomenology in The 
Poetics of Space as, “consideration of the onset of the image in an 
individual consciousness.”25, thereby calling to our notice the central 
importance of personal experience.  Heidegger is more forthright when he 
says,  
 
We shall maintain that phenomenology is not just one philosophical 
science among others, nor is it the science preparatory to the rest of 
them; rather the expression “phenomenology” is the name for the 
method of scientific philosophy in general.26  
 
Heidegger thus places phenomenology at the centre of any and all 
philosophical investigation, including our investigation into person centered 
healthcare. Heidegger’s affirmation will resound throughout all of the 
succeeding arguments in this work. 
 
Phenomenology is the study of things as they appear to us as distinguished 
from what they “really” are, whatever that might be. We cannot experience 
things which are beyond our experience, that much is obvious, so the way 
that we experience the world, and the things we discover in appearance, 
becomes central to our understanding (some would say knowledge) of the 
world.  This, as we shall see in good time, includes our understanding of 
illness. Phenomenology prioritizes the first hand lived experience of 
individuals, these singular subjective accounts are complementary to any 
other accounts that we might create, and taken together all of these 
accounts give us a complete picture of what we call world so that, 
 
Phenomenology might be introduced as the attempt to found a 
conceptual apparatus based on lived experience—the first-person 
 18 
perspective—in contrast to the theories and investigations of 
empirical science—the third-person perspective.27  
 
Heidegger’s phenomenology gives prominence to the everyday and to the 
interpretation of Dasein in what he calls, “average everydayness”.28 Dasein 
is Heidegger’s term for the being that we all have to be. The literal 
translation would be “being-there” but this does not reflect the depth or 
breadth of this central notion to Heidegger’s thinking. Above all Dasein 
does not denote the isolated experiencing subject. Dasein is more of an 
activity or a process, indeed we find Heidegger’s work all the more 
accessible when we look on what might be nouns (being) as verbs (being). 
In this way the dynamic form of Heidegger’s analysis is preserved. For 
Heidegger phenomenal entities (entities that can appear) have their being 
both spatially and temporally and to forget or omit consideration of either 
one of these leads to misunderstanding. The notion of Dasein 
encompasses both of these aspects of our being.29 Everydayness is 
precisely what it appears to be, the ordinary everyday existence that we all 
have every day, so that, 
 
"Everydayness" means the "how" in accordance with which Dasein 
"lives unto the day", whether in all its ways of behaving or only in 
certain ones which have been prescribed by Being-with-one-
another. To this "how" there belongs further the comfortableness of 
the accustomed.30  
And, 
 
Everydayness is a way to be - to which, of course, that which is 
publicly manifest belongs. But it is more or less familiar to any 
"individual" Dasein as way of existing which it may have as its own.31  
 
This means that his analysis of both Dasein and world is rooted in our 
everyday experience of the world; we begin with and return to the 
everyday. Heidegger’s interpretations gain their strength from the ways 
that, through the priority given to the everyday, they arrive at 
understandings of the world which are in tune with, rather than at odds with, 
these everyday understandings. These are the ways of being in the world 
that we use all of the time, and yet we do not require any necessary 
appreciation or understanding of why we do what we do in our everyday 
lives. We are phenomenological beings even when we do not realise it. 
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Why not Phenomenology? 
Jonathan Sholl has attempted to show the limitations of the use of 
phenomenology in this area, in particular how it is used by Svenaeus, Carel 
and Toombs.32 All of these three use the work of Heidegger and Gadamer 
and I believe that Sholl’s  criticism is based on an important  and fatal mis-
reading of the truly radical nature of Heidegger’s position. However, it is 
important to address briefly the approach that Sholl takes before 
proceeding any further with the argument. This will also begin to 
demonstrate just how different is Heidegger’s, and my own, approach to 
the question. Sholl says, 
 
By beginning from the idea that humans are intimately connected to 
their world through their body, it seems clear that understanding 
illness requires an understanding of how this bodily connection is 
disrupted and how this, in turn, alters other aspects of human 
experience, such as spatiality and temporality.33 
 
But this is a mistaken beginning; we are not intimately connected with the 
world but, as Heidegger would say, worldly. The difference is crucial in that 
Heidegger will not brook any kind of separation between consciousness 
and world so the question of the intimacy of our connection can never arise. 
To introduce this question betrays a residual alliance to the notion of an 
isolated subject consciousness and means that Sholl’s argument will 
inevitably miss the point.  Heidegger is clear that if we choose this kind of 
starting point we can never understand the nature of being. We will be 
continually misled in our understanding of being back into the corral of the 
isolated Cartesian subject in which we are each understood as individual 
but separated thinking beings. Under the Cartesian analysis the relation 
we have to other beings like ourselves and even the inanimate entities that 
make up our world becomes automatically problematic, this is a problem 
that Heidegger will not set. Sholl continues with, 
 
First, it is often claimed that since we are necessarily embodied 
beings, it is problematic to think that the self ‘has’ a body. Rather, 
for a phenomenologist, we do not have our bodies, but we are our 
bodies. The claim, then, is not that the self can be reduced to the 
body, but that the body is fundamentally a lived body: ‘my body is 
me’. Moreover, as this embodiment entails that our consciousness 
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is also embodied, we cannot separate, either conceptually or 
empirically, consciousness and body; body and mind are unified or 
integrated in our lived experience of the world.34  
 
This again is a fundamental misconception of Being-in-the-world and one 
which persists throughout Sholl’s paper. The Cartesian paradigm does 
more than separate body and mind; it treats them as distinct objects to be 
categorized so that the separation of these two “things” found in Descartes 
is itself a product of the misunderstanding of being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology first and foremost rejects any 
approach of this kind.35 Be-ing is a verb and a process not a noun and a 
thing. Sholl continues to betray a residual alliance to the notion of an 
isolated subject which is specifically rejected by Heidegger and those like 
Svenaeus, Carel and Toombs who use Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenological approach in their understandings of illness and the 
process of healthcare. Sholl fails to appreciate that what Carel, Toombs 
and Svenaeus provide is a hermeneutic interpretation of illness and which 
therefore encompasses all aspects including both the natural and the 
phenomenological.  
 
Sholl argues that naturalism, an approach which broadly suggests that 
illness can be defined in terms of physical symptoms and observable 
variations in the body, when it is expanded to take into account the 
subjective appearance of illness in addition to objective measurement, 
makes the recourse to phenomenology unnecessary. However, this fails to 
appreciate that, while it may be the case that naturalism can accommodate 
the idea of first person experience into our understanding of illness, the 
broader point is that naturalism itself rests on the phenomenological basis 
and is a product of phenomenology. In this case it is no surprise that 
naturalism can accommodate first person experience. It is not the 
phenomenologist who must fit in with the scientist but the other way 
around. Sholl is accepting and criticizing the existential nature of the 
interpretations provided by phenomenologist, but he is falling to see the 
connection between this approach and the underlying hermeneutics of 
phenomenological ontology. Rather than requiring an expansion to include 
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the natural, phenomenology already includes naturalism. In effect Scholl’s 
position rests on phenomenological presumptions. It is at times like this 
that we need to remember Heidegger’s position with regard to 
phenomenology. 
 
We shall maintain that phenomenology is not just one philosophical 
science among others, nor is it the science preparatory to the rest of 
them; rather the expression “phenomenology” is the name for the 
method of scientific philosophy in general.36 
 
In effect Sholl underestimates the radical nature of Heidegger’s work in 
completely reframing the question of our relation to Others and to the world 
and therefore changing the starting position for the discussion. We cannot 
begin with the isolated subject consciousness, and if we make the attempt 
then we will fail to gain any understanding of the relationship between 
consciousness and world which is at the root of the phenomenological 
understanding of illness. We are most usefully guided here by Heidegger 
when he says, 
 
We said that we wanted to feel our way forward to the essence of 
truth as unhiddenness. This meant: we are dispensing with a 
definition. Perhaps a definition is precisely what is least suitable for 
grasping an essence. It is not a matter of capturing this essence in 
sentences (or in a single sentence) that we can repeat and pass on. 
The sentence as such says least of all. Instead it is a matter of 
feeling our way, of asking if, and how, unhiddenness consists in, and 
has its origins in, the unity of the indicated connections.37  
 
The question must be “What is the meaning of Being (illness), as in what 
makes it possible?” rather than the sterile “What is it?”38 
 
Phenomenology and Illness 
While Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology gives this approach a 
pre-eminent position in any enquiry about human experience and 
understanding, it is the way that phenomenology gives priority to the 
accounts that we are able to give about our illness which give the method 
its power when we consider person centered healthcare. These everyday 
accounts are the stock-in-trade of Heideggerian phenomenology and as 
such become central to any discussion of person centered healthcare. Just 
as we begin with the everyday Being of Dasein in our inquiry into the nature 
 22 
of the Being of Dasein, so we must begin our inquiry into the nature of 
illness and healthcare with the everyday experience of those who are ill. 
Indeed where else is there to begin? Glendinning, quoting Frege, makes 
the point vividly with, “Someone can have sympathy for me but still my pain 
always belongs to me and his sympathy to him”.39 Havi Carel makes the 
case much more fully in her work Illness when she distinguishes two 
common approaches to the understanding of illness; the naturalistic 
(mechanical) and normative (comparative) conceptions of illness40 and 
explains how both of these, even when taken together, are inadequate to 
provide us with a complete notion of illness. To achieve this we must add 
an account of what it is like to be ill. Once we have this we can begin a 
phenomenological interpretation of illness and eventually bring out an 
understanding of what it means to be ill. This will in turn point towards a 
person centered approach to healthcare as the most appropriate response 
to those who are unwell. In Heidegger’s terms if we are to understand the 
nature of illness and to come to some conclusions as to how to treat it we 
would best attempt a phenomenological interpretation of the Dasein who is 
unwell. I will return to this in more detail later,41 suffice to say, for the 
moment, that phenomenology will be the guiding methodology in this work. 
 
Heidegger and the Question of Other minds 
The problem of “others” and “other minds” has entertained generations of 
philosophers and attempts at a solution are many and varied, both in form 
and success. The only thing that is certain is that unless we can find a way 
of thinking which avoids placing a difficult (some would say unbridgeable) 
gap between those who provide care and those who receive it then we will 
find it hard to justify a person centered approach to healthcare. On the 
other hand, if this ground can be gained, and this perceived gap between 
us can be eliminated, we will be able to begin to show how and why person 
centered care is the appropriate approach to take in the provision of 
healthcare.  
 
Heidegger brings a new approach to the question when (paraphrasing 
Kant)42 he says of the problem of other minds, “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ 
 23 
is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected 
and attempted again and again.”43 Heidegger immediately recognises that 
the source of the problem is the notion of the isolated subject, when he 
says, 
 
In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject 
without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in 
the end an isolated “I” without Others is just as far from being 
proximally given.44 
 
The answer to the question “what is it?” when applied to ourselves or to 
Others must always result in a reply in terms of a kind of “thing” (in 
Descartes case a thinking thing)45 and, Heidegger claims, this attempt at 
categorical definition means that the answer will always be inadequate in 
terms of the existential entity under investigation. We are above all an entity 
which has both possibilities and connections as constitutive of our Being. 
 
In making this beginning Heidegger resolves to bring an existential and 
phenomenological analysis to bear on the question of the being of Dasein 
and of Others, as opposed to the unremittingly categorical interpretation 
demanded by Descartes and his successors. Heidegger does not offer a 
solution to the problem of other minds in the traditional manner, he re-
frames the question in such a way that the problem disappears as a 
problem.46 He discusses and dispenses with accounts which rest on the 
notion of the isolated subject and demonstrates that we exist as both 
Being-in-the-world and as Being-with-Others, so that, “Others are 
encountered environmentally” (and) “the world is always the one that I 
share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt].” 47 This 
goes much further than a simple affirmation that we exist in a world 
alongside Others. Dasein is only to be understood as active within the 
world of things and Others. No radical separation between Dasein and 
world, and therefore between Dasein and Others can be made. Within the 
world we encounter Others and, 
 
These entities are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on 
the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that 
they are there too and there with it. 48 
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Of course, remembering that, “‘With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood 
existentially, not categorically.”49 When we come to understand the world 
and to use equipment we find that Others, like ourselves, have already 
given their own meaning to the world and to entities that we engage with. 
As he says in a rather picturesque manner, 
 
When, for example we, we walk along the edge of a field but 
‘outside it’, the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a 
person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was 
bought at So-an-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a person 
and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in the 
Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; 
but even if it is a ‘boat which is strange to us’, it is still indicative of 
Others.50  
 
It is through unremitting existential analysis that we gain an authentic 
understanding of our own Being and of the Being of Others not as separate 
“things” but as beings constitutively engaged and involved. We are what, 
and who, we are because of Others. In this way Heidegger cements both 
the unity of Dasein and world, and the unity of Dasein and Others. This has 
been achieved not by bridging the gap, assumed by Cartesians and post-
Cartesians, between ourselves and Others, but by showing that there is no 
gap in the first place. Our understanding of the relation between ourselves 
and Others as isolated entities cannot account for our everyday experience 
of the world, it is thus is shown to be deficient in providing an understanding 
of everyday Dasein. It is now unity which is to be fundamental to being and 
not separation. If it is the case that we are constitutively related to Others, 
and that this relation is both fundamental and inescapable then we may 
only choose how we conduct this relationship. How we behave towards 
Others has become a matter of ontology. As Frank says with reference to 
the work of Levinas,51 
 
Living for the other is not… an act of exemplary goodness. Persons 
live for others because their own lives as human beings require 
living that way. The self is understood as coming to be human in 
relation to others and the self can only continue to be human by 
living for the Other.52 
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This has clear implications for the case in favour of a person centered 
approach to healthcare, but I will leave making these more explicit to a later 
chapter of this work when I set out and discuss Heidegger’s notion of 
solicitude,53 before that it is necessary to address the overall question, 
What do we understand by the Healthcare System? 
 
Hermeneutics 
For the purposes of this discussion I will understand the healthcare system 
as the sum of all of the encounters between those who seek help with their 
health problems and those who offer this help, I think that this approach 
provides an account of the healthcare system which will be familiar to those 
who work in the system and to those who receive care, as well as offering 
a philosophically robust and rich account of healthcare systems and the 
ways in which they operate. I will first elucidate this method using the work 
of Hans Georg Gadamer54 and then endeavour to see what consequences 
arise for our understanding of the healthcare system and the case for 
person centered healthcare. 
 
When he considers the nature of experience Gadamer says, “That life 
manifests itself in experience means simply that life is the ultimate 
foundation”55, and then, “The unity of experience as determined by its 
intentional content stands in an immediate relationship to the whole of, to 
the totality of life.”56 This is obviously reminiscent of Heidegger’s emphasis 
on the everyday in his analysis of Dasein. We begin with our own 
experience of our own lives, but these experiences are not any kind of 
disconnected phenomena randomly following one another. Together they 
make up the very fabric of our lives, so that, 
 
Every experience is taken out of the continuity of life and at the same 
time related to the whole of one’s life. It is not simply that an 
experience remains vital only as long as it has not been fully 
integrated into the context of one’s life consciousness, but the very 
way it is “preserved and dissolved” (aufgehoben) by being worked 
into the whole life consciousness goes far beyond any “significance” 
it might be thought to have. Because it is itself within the whole of 
life, the whole of life is present in it too.57  
 
 26 
When this is combined with, “The significance of that whose being consists 
in expressing an experience cannot be grasped except through 
experience.”58 We can see that Gadamer’s method (like that of Heidegger) 
is both existential and phenomenological. His explicit assertion of the 
centrality and individuality of human experience comes together with the 
recognition that the significance of this experience is to be found not in the 
experience itself but in the context of the “totality of life”. This gives us a 
phenomenological hermeneutic, an understanding of experience from 
within experience itself. In Gadamer’s world there is no “outside” no 
possibility of separation between ourselves and the world we experience, 
and consequently no separation between ourselves and the “Others” we 
encounter in experience. Like Heidegger before him Gadamer presents a 
direct challenge to the categorical ways in which we have been used to 
understanding both ourselves and our experience of the world. We can 
now see how Gadamer derives what he calls “the hermeneutical rule” 
 
Let us next consider how hermeneutics goes about its work… We 
recall the hermeneutical rule that we must understand the whole in 
terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole. This principle 
stems from ancient rhetoric, and modern hermeneutics has 
transferred it to the art of understanding. It is a circular relationship 
in both cases. The anticipation of meaning in which the whole is 
envisaged becomes actual understanding when the parts are that 
are determined by the whole themselves also determine this 
whole.59  
 
This means that,  
 
The harmony of the all the details with the whole is the criterion of 
correct understanding. The failure to achieve this harmony means 
that understanding has failed.60  
 
Understanding is achieved when we experience harmony between the 
detail and the whole. The attempt to make a categorical definition of 
anything is misguided because this beginning, in which we remove the 
entity under investigation from the context in which it is set, will precisely 
defeat our attempt to understand. In the same way that Heidegger sets 
each individual Dasein in the context of a world in which we find entities 
like ourselves (Others) so Gadamer recognises the contextuality of all 
experience. We all have our own unique experience of the world and it is 
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the harmony between the unique accounts of our experience and equally 
unique accounts given by Others which gives us what we call world. The 
same can be said of healthcare systems in which we seek the harmony of 
the parts and the whole, such harmony is offered by a person centered 
approach because it remembers and reinforces the importance of the 
individual encounters which make up the system as a whole. Again we are 
reminded of Heidegger’s advice with regard to the nature of truth.61 
 
If we apply this hermeneutic approach to the healthcare system it means 
that the system has no fixed or categorical identity and is constantly in flux 
and changing. It also means that it is not describable by any conventional 
means. If we understand the healthcare system to be the sum of all of the 
encounters between those who seek help with their health problems and 
those who offer this help, then we take a hermeneutic approach to our 
study of healthcare systems. The objects of our investigation become the 
individual accounts of the workings of the system given by all of those 
involved in the system, each one derived from their own unique experience 
of the system. Under this approach the details of the system (individual 
encounters) can only be understood in the context of the whole system and 
conversely the whole system can only be understood in relation to the 
details (individual encounters), so that in seeking understanding of the 
system we seek the harmony between these parts and the whole. Just as 
we gain the “totality of life” through a hermeneutic approach to all 
experience so a hermeneutic approach to healthcare systems will give us 
the totality of healthcare. As Gadamer says of world history, 
 
The context of world history—in which appears the true meaning of 
all the individual objects, large or small, of historical research—is 
itself a whole, in terms of which the meaning of every particular is to 
be fully understood, and which in turn can be fully understood only 
in terms of those particulars.62  
 
Just as hermeneutics is the foundation for the study of history so will it be 
the foundation for our study of healthcare systems and practices. What is 
more the kind of understanding we gain will be not quite like the one we 
might expect because, “Hermeneutics is an art not a mechanical process. 
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Thus it brings its work, understanding, to completion like a work of art”63. 
Once again, we are not looking for, and will not find, a definition of the 
healthcare system and we will be unable to recognise what we find in these 
categorical terms. The system resists this kind of definition because it is 
not a “thing” at all but an ongoing and ever changing process.  Under this 
form of analysis we will however have a way of understanding the 
healthcare system which is familiar to those operating within the system as 
either providers or receivers of care. From this starting point there flow a 
number of consequences for an analysis of healthcare systems. 
 
First, none of us, neither patient nor clinician is in a position to discuss or 
describe the healthcare system, except from our own unique position within 
the system. At any moment we all have a specific position with regard to 
the system and we necessarily prejudge the working of the system from 
that position. The truth of this is most acutely illustrated when our position 
undergoes a radical change, most commonly the change we experience 
from being a provider of healthcare to being on the receiving end of care. 
The radical alteration of our position within the system of healthcare 
changes how we see the system in ways that we could not imagine before 
we became unwell. Under this kind of analysis we can see that it is 
essential, for the sake of hermeneutic completeness, that we appreciate 
fully and equally all of the perspectives held by all those who participate in 
the system including, and especially, those who receive care. As Gadamer 
will remind us, we are all, always “in play”, but this has even deeper 
consequences. It is the fact that we are “in play” that makes our analysis 
possible at all. If we did not have a position within the system we would 
have no perspective from which to discuss and give account of the system. 
Of course no-one who is concerned to give an account of the system can 
do so from outside the system because the system has no “outside” or 
“inside” and being “in play” is not a choice we can accept or deny. We all 
have an individual position with respect to the working of the healthcare 
system; the only thing that changes is the precise nature of our position. 
After all we are all patients or potential patients. This means that there can 
be no categorical account of the healthcare system, only one made up of 
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numerous subjective accounts all of which have their own value, both to 
those who provide them and to those who wish to understand the system. 
Again, from Gadamer on history we see that, 
 
If we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the 
historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical 
situation, we are always affected by history. It determines in 
advance both what seems to be worth enquiring about and what will 
appear as an object of investigation.64 
 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach demands that we give up the futile 
attempt to find categorical objectivity and attend most closely to our own 
subjective experience. This is because understanding is only to be found 
in the interpretation of experience and the only experience we have is our 
own. In this way a host of interpretations develop based on the perspective 
of each individual; the validity of each interpretation is determined 
according to how well it fits the field of meaning which is generated by the 
entity in question, rather than any categorical definition of the entity. We do 
not need a categorical, ideal or objective definition of the healthcare system 
to enable us to distinguish between valid and invalid interpretations, we are 
able to understand and evaluate not only our own interpretation but also 
those of others from our position within the system. In this way we can 
retain the notion of the healthcare system as an ever changing scene while 
also retaining the ability to determine what is, and what is not, true about 
the system itself.  The implications of this for healthcare systems and the 
way that they operate should be clear, and taking a person centered 
approach begins to look like a persuasive option because this is the 
approach which validates the interpretations of those in the system who 
are receiving care; in effect the perspective of those who give the system 
its most fundamental meaning. Healthcare systems only exist because 
there are people who need care. 
 
Second, and following on from this, the healthcare system is not 
understood as any kind of thing. The encounters which make up the system 
continue every day and their nature may change as a result of changing 
circumstances. These changes may be intended or, more often than not 
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unintended, as individuals (persons and clinicians) make decisions about 
how they seek and deliver care with regard to a myriad of different factors. 
The healthcare system is a dynamic process which is in constant motion, 
it moves forward and changes as we speak. It is not just that we have a 
moving target when we come to consider the nature of the healthcare 
system, movement and change constitutes the system itself so our account 
needs to be dynamic and one which accommodates the ever changing 
narratives through which we understand the system. 
 
Thirdly the meaning of the healthcare system can be found in each and 
every one of the millions of encounters that take place every day, as 
Gadamer says, “Every part expresses something of the whole of life—i.e., 
has significance for the whole—just as its own significance is determined 
by the whole”65  Any analysis of an individual encounter will yield 
information about, and understanding of, the whole service, and vice versa. 
This means that we must not rely for our understanding of the system on 
large scale data analysis and the “big picture”. We cannot pretend that we 
are outside the system. Anecdotal evidence concerning the first hand lived 
experience of patients and clinicians (storytelling) is rehabilitated in our 
analysis and becomes at least as valuable as big data in giving us an 
understanding of the system at work.  The lived experience of the ill person 
is placed at the centre of our understanding, not only of illness but inevitably 
of healthcare. 
 
Fourthly, if the healthcare system is understood as the sum of all of the 
encounters then it can only be changed if the nature of these individual 
encounters is changed. No kind of organisational change can be effective 
which does not first and foremost begin with and have an impact on the 
individual encounters. This hermeneutic approach means that the focal 
point of the system must be the encounter between the person seeking 
care and the person offering care. In this sense the system is already 
person centered in that it depends for its reality and its meaning on the 
decisions and actions of persons on both sides of the encounter. They are 
the healthcare system at that time and place, as are all of the other persons 
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engaged in similar encounters elsewhere in the system. This in effect 
revalidates information and evidence that has previously been invalidated 
as merely subjective or anecdotal and places it back to the centre of our 
understanding of the nature of healthcare. 
 
Overall a hermeneutic approach not only gives us an understanding of the 
healthcare system which is familiar to those who are in everyday 
engagement with the system, it offers a philosophical interpretation which 
is both robust and rich in terms of any analysis of the working of healthcare 
systems, and which points clearly to the ontological ground for person 
centered healthcare. 
 
phenomenology = ontology = hermeneutics 
 
To summarise the case so far, we can see how Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach combines with his own and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics to give us ontology. This is because, 
 
Phenomenology, for Heidegger, is a method, its object is to let things 
show themselves as they are, and how they are possible (ontology). 
This means that only as phenomenology is ontology really 
possible.66  
 
In terms of our discussion of the philosophical basis for person centered 
healthcare we can see from Heidegger that a phenomenological 
investigation of illness and of healthcare will lead us to an ontology of 
illness and healthcare, indeed this is the only way that we can achieve this. 
If conducted phenomenologically our investigation will show us how these 
phenomena are possible and in so doing directs us towards the kinds of 
authentic ways in which we might respond to those who are unwell. In 
practical terms this means that we must attend to the specific individual 
experience of everyone involved in the healthcare system in order to gain 
an understanding. We must allocate a new priority to the experience of 
those who receive care; their account of their experience is unique and 
vitally constitutive of the whole system, to the extent that without it we 
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cannot ever understand the system and its workings. This is at least part 
of what we mean by person centered healthcare. 
 
Heidegger also gives us a new understanding of our relationship with the 
Others we find in the world; we are not disconnected or distant from these 
Others. We are not simply there “with” them nor are they simply there “too”; 
our own Being is constituted by our relationship to these others to the 
extent that for the most part we exist as “they”. This kind of understanding 
is only possible when we accept Heidegger’s existential interpretation of 
Dasein, rather than seeking the categorical definitions of the post-
Cartesian traditions. By re-framing, Heidegger’s interpretation dissolves 
the problem of Other minds. It remains to be seen whether or not we will 
be persuaded that his interpretation of Being-with-Others can provide a 
reason for any kind of behaviour towards Others, person centered or 
otherwise, and I will return to this question in Chapter Four in a discussion 
of Heidegger’s notion of solicitude. 
 
Gadamer’s contribution to the argument is considerable. By emphasising 
the hermeneutical element of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Being of 
Dasein which begins and ends with everyday Being, he opens the way to 
an understanding of experience, world and, for our own purposes, 
healthcare systems which is philosophically rich, and yet familiar to those 
who are daily engaged in the system. The hermeneutical rule, in urging us 
to understand the detail in terms of the whole and the whole in terms of the 
detail, means that the unique anecdotal accounts of all of those engaged 
in the healthcare system gain a new and vital priority. To paraphrase both 
Heidegger and Gadamer, we must begin with the everyday experience of 
those who give and receive care and return to this everydayness our 
completed interpretations. In short, our approach must be person centered.  
 
In the next Chapter I will consider the question, “What is the purpose of the 
healthcare system?” with the intention of beginning to show that this 
purpose can only be achieved through a person centered approach. 
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Chapter Three - What is Healthcare For? 
 
Autonomy is the End of Healthcare 
Having established the basis of the ontological relationship between 
different Others through Heidegger’s notions of Being-in-the-world and 
Being-with-Others, and the setting out of Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach 
and its potential application to healthcare systems, I now want to turn to the 
healthcare system itself and attempt to understand its purpose. By the end 
of this chapter, and using a phenomenological and existential approach to 
the questions at issue, I  will show that the combination of our inescapable 
relation to Others, a hermeneutic approach to the understanding of 
healthcare systems, (which places the experience of those providing and 
those receiving care at the centre), and the affirmation of the restoration and 
preservation of personal autonomy as the purpose of the healthcare 
system, provides the philosophical ground for person centered healthcare. 
 
I will argue in this chapter not simply that respect for patient autonomy is a 
fundamental principle of healthcare,67 but that it is the main purpose of 
healthcare to both preserve and to restore (where it is absent) the autonomy 
of persons. The argument will be that respect for patient autonomy gains its 
fundamental place in healthcare practice because the main purpose of 
healthcare is to protect and restore autonomy. The result of this will be that 
the practice of person centered healthcare maximizes the independence of 
those who become ill. In all of this we must remember that the entity we call 
healthcare is not any kind of “thing” but the sum of all of the encounters 
which take place under the heading of healthcare. This hermeneutic 
understanding of the healthcare system will remain central to the discussion 
as characteristic of our understanding of the nature of the healthcare 
system. We are precisely not dealing here with an entity with any kind of 
fixed nature or essence, but a continuing activity in which we seek to find 
not a categorical definition but harmony between the whole and the parts, 
in this case the overarching purpose of healthcare and the individual acts 
of healthcare which constitute the system. 
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It is important at this stage to distinguish between two kinds of what we 
might call autonomy in order to avoid confusion at any later stage of the 
argument. When we encounter a doctor or other healthcare professional we 
voluntarily suspend our autonomy in the face of their exprtise.68 In this way 
we retain our freedom in the sense that Kant describes autonomy as the 
self-imposition of rules over ourselves.69 This is quite different to the loss of 
autonomy that we experience when we fall ill. This loss is entirely 
involuntary and occurs before any encounter with healthcare services and 
is experienced by us as an interference in our autonomy from beyond 
ourselves. The difference is important because, in the first case (voluntary 
suspension of autonomy) we retain the freedom to choose and to act. In the 
case of illness (involuntary loss of autonomy) our freedom to act and decide 
is taken away from us by our illness, whatever may be the cause of the 
illness, or the kind of illness we are suffering from. We experience illness 
itself as an external constraint which we wish to see removed, usually with 
the assistance of some kind of healthcare professional. If our illness persists 
(for example in the case of chronic or degenerative illness) we eventually 
adapt to the new reality and make choices within the more restricted sphere 
of our being-unwell. It is our ability to choose and to act which makes us the 
kind of beings that we are and all the time that we are alive we retain our 
being-as-possibility or fundamental autonomy even when these possibilities 
are restructured by illness. Death is the end of the possibility of possibility, 
and thus the end of our being. 
 
To summarise; we lose autonomy because of the illness, whatever that is. 
When we seek a therapeutic encounter (or in the case of severe mental 
illness when it is sought on our behalf) we suspend our autonomy for the 
period of the therapeutic intervention in the face of greater expertise (just 
as would an apprentice when learning from a master). This means that it is 
crucial that both parties to the encounter remember that this suspension of 
autonomy is temporary and is, overall, intended as a means to enable us to 
regain our fundamental autonomy which has been taken from us by illness. 
I will specifically discuss the encounter between healthcare professional 
and the person who is unwell in the next chapter, but for now we can return 
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to the argument that the maximization of autonomy is the fundamental 
purpose of all healthcare. 
 
The force of the argument will lie in the connection between the extrinsic 
purpose of healthcare, the attempt to restore the autonomy which is lost 
when we become unwell, (in existential terms our ability to “do” as we “will”), 
and the practices which are intrinsic to healthcare (how we are cared for). I 
will argue that the process of healthcare, which has autonomy as its 
extrinsic purpose, must, if it is to be consistent with this purpose, operate in 
ways which respect the personal autonomy of those who are cared for in 
every aspect of healthcare practice. This is a specifically hermeneutic point 
in that we are here seeking harmony between the details of the system and 
our understanding of the whole, the harmony between the extrinsic purpose 
of healthcare and the intrinsic practice of providing care to each individual 
who needs it. In short, the intrinsic practice of healthcare must be person 
centered or risk contradicting its own purpose. 
 
Before commencing with the substantive arguments to establish the 
preservation and restoration of autonomy as the purpose of healthcare we 
must be clear that healthcare is an activity with a purpose and not simply 
some random or meaningless human enterprise. I do not think that this 
requires much in the way of argument. Healthcare by its very nature is 
purposive since it is the activity of providing care to those who want and 
need it. It is clear that those who seek and receive care do so with an aim 
in mind, to get better; moreover, those who provide care are not indifferent 
to the outcome of their endeavour. The healthcare system understood as 
the totality of all of the continuing encounters between those who seek and 
those who deliver care can have a purpose only and because the activity of 
those engaged in it is individually purposive, that is, the outcomes of their 
actions matter to them. It is this mattering that makes the system what it is 
and makes it purposive. Healthcare has been described as “a complex 
clinical, human and moral endeavour”70 and whatever else it may be it is an 
endeavour with a purpose. Gadamer affirms this purpose when he says, 
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The special quality of the art of healing, namely, that this 
act, unlike the arts for producing artifacts has as its task 
the restoration of something natural.71  
 
He hints that this goal might be autonomy when he says, 
 
Although health is naturally the goal of the doctor’s activity it is not 
actually ‘made’ by the doctor. Connected to this is something further: 
the goal of health is not a condition that is clearly definable from 
within the medicinal art. For illness is a social state of affairs.72  
 
Thus he refers us beyond the field of disease and medicine and into the 
lives of the unwell, and their social being-with-others. It only remains then 
to determine the nature of this purpose, to do this I will first and briefly look 
at the importance of the idea of personal autonomy to our own self-
understanding. I will then look at the ways in which illness diminishes and 
threatens our lives and the way that we then seek help from the healthcare 
system to restore our lost autonomy. The conclusion will be that, under this 
analysis, healthcare which is not intrinsically person centered defeats its 
own purpose and in so doing betrays our understanding of healthcare. 
 
Autonomy 
Autonomy means self-government, and is at the root of all that it is to be a 
human individual. The ability to determine our own destiny, to make choices 
against the background of circumstance, to be the author of our own life 
choices, is one of the most prized notions we hold about ourselves. We 
have only to think how we feel when we see this freedom to act threatened 
or see how others react when it is proposed to remove theirs. In saying this 
we are directly following Heidegger and Sartre73 in the way that they both 
discuss and define freedom existentially, (the influence of Kant on both of 
these thinkers should also be acknowledged).74 We are what we do and in 
choosing what we do we make ourselves who we are as Gadamer says, 
 
For what fundamentally characterizes the essential constitution of 
human beings is that although their nature, just like that of any other 
living being, strives after fulfillment, what counts for them as 
fulfillment is not unquestioningly pre-established; rather they can set 
their own goals for themselves.75  
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Strong cases for the importance of personal autonomy in general have been 
made by many philosophers, perhaps most notably Kant76 and Mill.77 I will 
not set out these cases here since to do so would distract from the flow of 
the specific discussion of healthcare. I am well aware of the power of these 
arguments and, even unstated; they provide a backdrop to the argument 
that the restoration and protection of autonomy is the fundamental purpose 
of healthcare. 
 
In the case of our understanding of illness and the purpose of healthcare, 
and consistent with the existential approach, I will consider here more the 
nature of actual autonomy, as Agich says, “Actual autonomy is not best 
understood in terms of decisional modes, but in the daily ebb and flow of 
action and experience”78, and Trotter puts it well when he says, 
 
Autonomy as self-sovereignty is the quality of living in accordance 
with one’s inner nature or genius. A condition for autonomy as self-
sovereignty is living apart from, or in defiance of, powers that compel 
one to forfeit or exchange quantities of life for ‘‘goods’’ that one does 
not recognize as such, or does not recognize as worth the 
exchange.79  
 
It is this “quality of living in accordance with one’s inner nature” that we lose 
when we become unwell and the same quality of living that we look to be 
restored by healthcare. We need therefore to understand what precisely it 
is that we have lost and what we are hoping that those providing healthcare 
will restore. From a personal point of view, and in order to understand the 
nature of this loss, we need first to understand what happens to us when 
we fall ill and the relationship between being ill and being healthy. I will 
consider this under four related headings, these will be: the nature of the 
loss which we experience in illness, suffering, alienation, (or the sense we 
have of not-being-at-home when we are ill, and equilibrium (as in the 
disturbance of the balance of our lives). To some extent these distinctions 
are arbitrary, and the connections will at times be recognizable in each 
separate consideration. I will finally argue that all of these relate to, and 
constitute together, a fundamental loss of autonomy in illness and one to 
which all healthcare, whatever its immediately apparent purpose, responds. 
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Loss 
When we fall ill we experience a loss and although we may characterize, or 
be characterized by others, as having gained something (an illness), it does 
not feel like this. Loss is one of the most significant ways in which we 
ourselves experience our being-unwell. We do not notice the addition of a 
disease rather we are called towards the loss of bodily functions which had 
previously carried on unnoticed. Amongst the many narratives of illness I 
want to briefly consider only two under this heading of “Loss”. Havi Carel 
and S. Kay Toombs both suffer from progressive and degenerative 
conditions80 and both have engaged in extensive philosophical reflection 
about their experience of illness, both therefore provide the kind of first-
hand accounts of their experience which is in accord with our 
phenomenological existential approach. 
 
For both of these women, illness is at least in part a matter of loss of bodily 
function. This is summed up by Carel when she says, “In illness the 
biological body comes to the fore, as it ceases to cooperate with the ill 
person’s desires.”81 This focus on loss of autonomy has consequences for 
healthcare and as Toombs points out, 
 
Such insights have practical application in the clinical context. 
Indeed, if therapy is to be successful, it is essential to address the 
global sense of disorder that permeates the patient's everyday life.82  
 
If we continue with the existential style of analysis we can say that illness is 
experienced as the inability to do things that we have been used to doing; 
a gap opens up between our willed existence and our biological existence. 
We can no longer do the things that we will. In illness this is experienced as 
a sudden, or relatively sudden, loss of ability to act as we will, while in 
ageing the loss is more gradual and therefore less noticeable. In both cases 
(illness and ageing) the loss is a loss of personal autonomy. Gadamer puts 
the general point about loss of function very well when in a style reminiscent 
of Heidegger,83 he says, “it is only in its absence, that I notice what was 
previously there, or, more precisely not what was previously there but that 
it was there.”84 For Carel the experience of loss is more personal so that, 
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The bodily foundations of autonomous adulthood are often 
removed, revealing the tentative and temporary nature of these 
foundations. Illness can disclose and make salient finitude, dis-
ability, and alienation from one’s body as extreme modes of being.85  
 
In the case of illness when this loss becomes more than we can manage, 
and at this stage pain is often the trigger, we consult someone with expertise 
in healthcare as a means of seeking the assistance we need to restore our 
previously experienced autonomy. For example, when I injure my leg while 
gardening I find that I am unable to cycle (it hurts!). If after a few days, and 
when I really want to cycle again and my leg will still not let me (it still hurts), 
I go to the doctor to find out what is wrong and how it can be fixed so that I 
can resume my previous level of autonomy and go cycling again. Of course 
there are many more varied and complex scenarios that occur every day in 
every healthcare system but all of them, however complex and varied, 
conform in essence to this basic analysis of loss and attempted restoration 
of autonomy. Carel expresses this in philosophical terms when she says, 
 
The body responds to the environment in an ongoing dialogue. 
Everything else depends on the body’s ability to perform, predict and 
react appropriately to stimuli. The body is the core of our existence 
and the basis for any interaction with the world.86 
 
Illness represents the interruption of this dialogue and constitutes a threat 
to our existence as an existential being so that, 
 
Illness is not simply a problem in an isolated physiological body part, 
but a problem with the whole embodied person and her relationship 
to her environment. Because the lived body is not just the biological 
body but ones contextual being in the world, a disruption of bodily 
capacities has a significance that far exceeds that of simple bodily 
function… It is not just a body function that is disrupted. Rather an 
entire way of being in the world that is disrupted.87  
 
To this extent the loss we experience in illness is the loss of ourselves. 
 
Toombs gives a vivid account of her loss of autonomy when she becomes 
ill with multiple sclerosis, she says, “my illness is the impossibility of taking 
a walk around the block or of carrying a cup of coffee from the kitchen to 
the den”88, and then with reference to a wider loss of personal autonomy, 
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Loss of upright posture not only concretely diminishes one's own 
autonomy (as a person who routinely uses a wheelchair I have no 
choice but to request assistance in a world designed for upright 
bodies) but it causes others those who are still upright to treat one 
as dependent. Whenever I am accompanied by an upright person, 
in my presence strangers invariable address themselves to my 
companion and refer to me in the third person.89  
 
While this is one of the more extreme case of loss of autonomy it represents 
the more general disruption that we all experience when we become unwell, 
as she says, 
 
The disruption of this unified body/world system also includes the 
disruption of the body as intentional locus. Surrounding objects that 
were formerly used unthinkingly are now encountered as overt 
problems to the body.90 
 
Loss is not localized. Illness, by changing what we can do, changes who we 
can be. In the case of the minor and self-limiting illnesses which plague all 
of us throughout our lives the change is temporary and short lived. We are 
soon restored to our full ability and take up once again our place in the 
world. In the case of serious illness, and particularly in the case of chronic 
illness, the loss cannot be fully restored and we have to “learn to live with 
it”. We are changed forever and “not-being-able-to-do” becomes part of who 
we are. I understand this only too well from my own experience of chronic 
illness and life changing surgery. We live, and mourn our loss, but we learn 
to be who we have become, and we look to those who provide healthcare 
to assists us in this task. 
 
Both Havi Carel and S. Kay Toombs are philosophers living with 
progressive and degenerative diseases and it is clear from what they say 
that loss is a constant feature of their lives as their health deteriorates. While 
both of these cases present examples at the extreme of loss through illness, 
they vividly illustrate what happens to us in terms of loss of function when 
we become unwell, and the way that this loss changes their lives. Gadamer 
recognises this when he says of doctors who have thought about it, 
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The most fundamental challenge which faces them is not simply to 
aid the recovery of the person who is sick. Rather they are 
confronted with the challenge of restoring to patients their own 
sense of self-identity by enabling them to return to and take up again 
their own particular way of life and to exercise their own particular 
abilities.91 
 
The loss that we experience when we fall ill is a loss of autonomy and, 
because of the centrality of the notion of autonomy to our sense of who we 
are as what we are able to do this loss constitutes a very real threat to our 
existence, both materially and ontologically. Person centered healthcare 
responds to this loss by supporting the maximisation of autonomy. 
 
The Case for Suffering 
The amelioration and alleviation of suffering is naturally held to be at least 
one of the purposes of healthcare and while I will not contest this belief I 
think that it can be quite simply shown that the relief of suffering is one 
aspect of the attempt to preserve and restore autonomy and that the relief 
of suffering can therefore be subsumed under the overall desire to preserve 
and restore autonomy. 
 
As I mentioned above it is often our suffering pain which precipitates us into 
a formal state of illness. We make public our feeling unwell perhaps by 
admission that we cannot go to work or attend a social function, or 
eventually when we present with our symptoms to the doctor. Svenaeus 
says that, “pain is a feature of my intentional bodily being.”92 And at more 
length, 
 
Illness makes us feel our own bodies: it reveals the body to us in 
different ways, through making it heavy, stiff, hot, nauseated, 
plagued by pain, twists, jerks, shivers, etc.93 
 
It is indisputable that the experience of illness is an experience of suffering, 
this much is clear to any of us who have experienced the pain and 
discomfort of illness, but suffering is more than just pain, 
 
‘Suffering’ is understood as fundamentally different from ‘pain’ in 
that the entity experiencing it is a person, not merely a body. More 
specifically, ‘suffering’ occurs when forthcoming destruction of one’s 
personhood is perceived and continues until the threat has passed 
 42 
or the integrity of the person is restored in some other way. It is 
ultimately a personal matter: its presence and extent can only be 
understood by the sufferer.94  
 
This explanation is both existential and phenomenological and it connects 
the suffering of the person in illness to a kind of loss of autonomy in much 
the same way as loss of capacity is seen as a threat to the existence of the 
human individual as a ‘being-able-to’ “set their own goals for themselves”.95 
When we suffer we suffer a threat to our individual integrity. As Carel puts 
it right at the beginning of her book Illness, “The first time I realized I couldn’t 
do something I felt surprise. It came as an insult.”96 This is further 
emphasized by Yelovich when she cites the example of the ballet dancer 
who suffers from the breathlessness of asthma but who suffers even more 
when the optimal treatment for her asthma so disrupts her physical capacity 
that she can no longer dance. From the treatment, given as result of her 
illness, she suffers the loss of her ability to dance; “she didn’t live just to 
breathe, but breathed so that she could dance”.97 In terms of her specific 
disease (asthma) her suffering was alleviated by the treatment, but this left 
out of account her being as a dancer and she then ‘suffers’ the loss of her 
ability to do that which makes her who she is. The case arises because the 
doctor treating her does not understand the individually specific nature of 
suffering and treats her as a case of asthma, rather than in a person 
centered way as a ballet dancer with asthma. As Yelovich makes clear, 
 
Although the ‘pain’ experienced by two thirty-five year old men who 
permanently lose the use of their left hand in the same way may be 
the same, the ‘suffering’ experienced by the sculptor will almost 
certainly exceed that experienced by the telephone insurance 
salesman, all other things being equal. ‘Suffering’ is not limited to 
the physical symptoms, but is mediated by patient meaning. “Most 
generally, ‘suffering’ can be defined as the state of severe distress 
associated with events that threaten the intactness of person.98  
 
Once again this links the experience of suffering with the nature of our 
individual Being as being able to set our own goals. At the root of our 
suffering is some kind of removal of capacity either through simple pain or 
some other aspect of our being unwell. Svenaeus goes further and says, 
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From a phenomenological point of view one could say that in many 
cases of suffering, and significantly, in the cases connected to pain 
and the other bodily ailments mentioned above, the ‘lived body’—
the body as a person’s way of existing and doing things in the 
world—displays an alien character in showing up as an obstacle and 
a limitation instead of as an affordance and possibility in life.99 
 
This character as obstacle denotes the loss of autonomy that we experience 
in the suffering brought about by illness; this is made even more explicit 
when he says, “pain unmakes the world of the person”100, and then, 
 
But pain does not stop at the sensation level of presenting the body 
as a troublesome and torturous alien; as a mood, it also affects the 
person’s ways of living in a world of human goals and projects. It 
does this by way of presenting the world in a new alien tonal-colour 
and in preventing our everyday doings through offering new and 
alien resistance, as I mentioned above. It can be a challenge to take 
a walk, climb the stairs, or wash the dishes when the body aches 
and refuses to perform in habitual ways, not to mention staying 
focused in a conversation at the workplace or playing soccer with 
the kids.101 
 
The effect of pain and suffering is to limit our possibilities and although 
suffering in illness is usually first manifested when we feel pain or discomfort 
what we are really beginning to experience is a loss of capacity and 
ultimately loss of autonomy. Our stride through life is interrupted by illness 
and the pain that we suffer is just the precursor of the restriction on our 
activity that illness will bring. If we are fortunate we will recover and the sign 
that this has happened is the cessation of pain and discomfort, which itself 
leads to a recovery of capacity. Our suffering is ended, and we continue as 
before. 
 
In the case of chronic illness suffering takes on a permanent role in our lives 
and we are never able to return to our activity as before so that, “In the 
chronically ill the orientation necessarily shifts from the removal of the cause 
of suffering to the suffering itself, since the suffering attacks the core of 
identity.”102 Chronic illness is different because it persists and with it persists 
the suffering so that, 
 
With the chronically ill patient managing the illness is coincident with 
managing one’s life. That is illness does not exist as some 
independent thing to be managed but as an element or factor in a 
common negotiation with the world. This means that chronic illness 
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involves a suffering that is far more subtle and pervasive than merely 
being made passive by an episode of acute illness.103 
 
It is in the example of chronic illness that suffering is revealed at bottom as 
loss of autonomy so that the relief of suffering represents a restoration of 
autonomy. In chronic illness we suffer a permanent loss of capacity, and if 
the illness is degenerative and progressive we suffer continuing loss. The 
suffering becomes a part of who we are and who we become because, “In 
chronic illness one undergoes the illness not as an intrusion into one’s life, 
but as a way of life”104 When we suffer chronic illness we suffer a permanent 
loss of capacity, an end to the way of life we had before we became ill, and 
the beginning of a life of reduced autonomy. 
 
Having established links between loss of capacity and loss of personal 
autonomy, and between the notion of suffering and loss of autonomy I will 
now look briefly at the idea that in illness we are precipitated into a state, or 
mood, of feeling not-at-home in our lives and show that the key to 
understanding this mood is as a loss of personal autonomy. 
 
Illness as Unhomelike Being-in-the–world 
The expression ‘unhomelike’ or ‘unheimlich’ is used by Heidegger in his 
interpretation of the everyday being of Dasein. It is the feeling we 
experience when we are abruptly removed, in the mood of anxiety, from our 
everyday preoccupations with the world to face the possibility of our own 
authentic being.105 In anxiety we are brought up short before the truth of our 
being, shaken out of the comfort of our everyday being. 
 
Anxiety individualises Dasein and discloses it as solus ipso … what 
it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with itself its world 
as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-
world.106  
And, 
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost 
potentiality-for- being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face 
to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being, and for 
this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.107 
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Most of the time we evade anxiety, we remain preoccupied with our 
everyday existence in the comfort of the at-home, but as Heidegger goes 
on to say, 
 
When in falling we flee into the “at home” of publicness, we flee in 
the face of the “not-at-home”; that is we flee in the face if the 
uncanniness which lies in Dasein—Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-
world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being. This 
uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its 
everyday lostness in the “they”, though not explicitly.108 
 
This means that, “the not-at-home must be conceived as the more 
primordial phenomenon”109, and that our everyday way of being (the at-
home) itself rests on, and is made possible by, the uncanniness that we 
experience when we understand our own being-in-the-world. We can only 
be ‘lost’ in everydayness if we have the possibility of finding ourselves. In 
illness the progress of our life is interrupted, and we face not only the 
possibility of our own Being-authentic but our own finitude. When we fall ill 
the uncanniness which pursues us catches up and we are brought up short 
and shaken out of our complacent and comfortable life. As Svenaeus puts 
it, 
 
A disease, at least a severe one, is indeed something which breaks 
in on us and destroys us. Such phenomena, according to 
Heidegger, resist meaning; they are even an offense to our attempts 
to find a place for them in our life as a meaningful whole. They strike 
against us as something totally unfamiliar, which threatens our 
existence.110 
And, 
The life-world is usually our home territory, but in illness this 
homelike being-in gives in and takes on an un-homelike character, 
in which the otherness of the body addresses us in a threatening 
way. It is the mission of health care professionals to try to 
understand such un-homelike being-in-the-world and bring it back 
to home-likeness again, or, at least, closer to home.111 
 
The life world that Svenaeus refers to is the life in which we are free to 
choose and in which we are in tune with our bodies. It is exemplified in the 
harmony between will and ability. We will and act in a seamless continuity 
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until this continuity is broken by illness. In illness we are out of tune with our 
bodies and we miss the homelikeness of good health. This experience is 
familiar to anyone who has ever received a diagnosis of serious illness; the 
effect is traumatic and prompts us to a complete re-assessment of our 
lives.112 Even if we are able to recover from illness we are forever affected 
by the trauma of illness and our outlook on life is changed. We experience 
the everyday life that we have recovered in quite another way and we 
appreciate the simple freedoms that others may take for granted, and that 
we certainly took for granted before we were ill. Illness prevents us from 
doing the things that we usually do and when this happens we feel not-at-
home in our bodies, even to the extent that we try to deny that we are ill at 
all. We attempt to alienate ourselves from our malfunctioning bodies hoping 
that illness will just go away; we pretend that we are not ill. Eventually, and 
however much we try to flee, illness catches up and we are faced with the 
uncanny, specifically the possibility of the end of the life that we know, and 
in the case of serious illness, the end all of our possibilities, the end of all 
our projecting and of all of our choosing. The implications for those who try 
to treat us become clear. 
Health care professionals must also address everyday life matters 
of patients with a phenomenological eye, addressing and trying to 
understand the being-in-the-world of the person’s life, which has 
turned unhomelike in illness.113 
 
In terms of the relationship between this feeling of not-being-at-home and 
the loss of personal autonomy the connection is clear. The way that we 
experience this unhomelike feeling is first through the pain and discomfort 
(both physical and mental) that illness brings, and then through the ways 
that this prevents us from carrying on with our everyday lives, lives which 
are full of choices, some of which we are now unable to make because, 
 
Illness is an unhomelike being-in-the-world in which the embodied 
ways of being-in of the self (person) have been thwarted. In illness 
the body shows up as an alien being (being me, yet not me) and this 
obstruction attunes the entire being-in-the-world of the ill person in 
an unhomelike way.114  
 
 47 
This understanding of illness and the quality it has of alienating us from our 
own bodies and making us feel not-at-home once again re-enforces the 
centrality of personal autonomy. In our ill and alienated state we are unable 
to do the things that we usually do. These are the things that not only make 
up our lives but which make us who we are. The restoration to a state of 
being-at-home with ourselves is the restoration we seek when we seek 
medical help, and this restoration is manifested when we are able to return 
to the things that we did before we were ill, in the seamless flow of willing 
and doing that makes up our everyday lives. In Heidegger’s terms we are 
restored to the everyday but with an understanding of the uncanny and our 
own finitude which remains with us. We understand our own possibility for 
being-authentic. This is the reason why people who have recovered from 
serious illness see their lives differently, once we have experienced the 
feeling of not-being-at-home we can never forget. 
I will now consider one further understanding of health and illness as a 
matter of balance or equilibrium this is given by Gadamer in his book of late 
essays, The Enigma of Health. 
Health as Equilibrium 
Gadamer’s first point is that doctors do not create health, “Although health 
is naturally the goal of the doctor’s activity it is not actually ‘made’ by the 
doctor.”115, this is because, “The special quality of the art of healing, namely, 
that this art unlike the art for producing artefacts has as its task the 
restoration of something natural.”116 We are thus left to consider what it is 
that is ‘natural’ that Gadamer expects to be restored by healthcare. The 
answer from Gadamer begins like this, 
 
It is obvious that the art of healing occupies an exceptional and 
problematic position. For here there is no ‘work’ produced by art and 
no ‘artificial product’… it belongs to the essence of the art of healing 
that its ability to produce is an ability to re-produce and re-establish 
something.117  
 
The aim of healthcare according to Gadamer is the re-establishment of a 
kind of equilibrium so that, 
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The expert practice of this art inserts itself entirely within the process 
of nature in so far as it seeks to restore this process when it is 
disturbed, and to do so in such a way that the art can allow itself to 
disappear once the natural equilibrium of health has returned.118 
 
For Gadamer illness has the nature of loss of natural equilibrium and in this 
we may hear echoes of the unheimlich from the work of Heidegger and 
Svenaeus. When we become unwell we are thrown off balance and in 
seeking healthcare we are seeking someone who can restore this balance. 
Loss of balance is an interruption of the smooth course of our lives and as 
a metaphor for what we feel when we become ill, and in particular when the 
illness is serious. It rings true, as Gadamer goes on to say, 
 
We encounter the recovery of equilibrium in exactly the same way 
as we encounter the loss if it, as a kind of sudden reversal. Properly 
speaking there is no continuous and perceptible transition from one 
to the other, but rather a sudden change of state… What we 
encounter here, by contrast, is the experience of balance.119 
 
When we recover from illness we regain our balance and, in the event of 
cure, we are able to continue with the kind of life we had before. We 
recognize when this happens when we are able to recommence making the 
everyday choices that we are all used to making and which illness makes 
difficult or impossible. However, this does not mean that there is only one 
possible state of equilibrium, incomplete recovery, or the steady loss of 
capacity that we experience as we age, necessitates continuous 
rebalancing and the finding of one new state of equilibrium after another. 
This means that the role of the healthcare worker, which as he has already 
pointed out, is not to produce anything but to restore something that is 
missing, becomes one of constant balancing and re-balancing our lives to 
the extent that, 
 
The consequence to be drawn from this is that medical practice is 
not concerned with actually producing equilibrium, that is with 
building up a new state of equilibrium from nothing, but rather is 
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always concerned with arresting and assisting the fluctuating 
equilibrium of health.120 
 
In all of this Gadamer is seeking to emphasize the experience of illness as 
central to our understanding of what it is to be well and what it is to be ill. 
His analysis is both existential and hermeneutic and focuses on the real 
individual who is unwell and who has lost equilibrium. 
 
Sickness and loss of equilibrium do not merely represent a medico-
biological state of affairs, but also a life historical and social process. 
The sick person is no longer simply identical with the person he or 
she was before. For the sick individual ‘falls out’ of things, has 
already fallen out of their normal place in life. But the individual who 
now lacks and misses something previously enjoyed still remains 
orientated towards returning to that former life.121 
 
The consequences for healthcare under this form of analysis are clear. It is 
the business of the doctor to attend to the restoration of equilibrium in the 
person seeking their help. We look to doctors to restore our equilibrium so 
that we can continue with our lives after the interruption of serious illness, 
or while we carry the burden of chronic illness. The life we wish to return to 
is not necessarily the one that we had before. Illness changes us and we 
can never be the same again. But whatever else it may turn out to be the 
life that we wish to return to is the life of choosing and deciding for ourselves 
about the things that we do, even when this choice is continually restricted 
by chronic illness. As patients, and as people who are experiencing loss of 
balance, we have lost control of our lives; the restoration of some kind of 
balance makes us able once again to resume the setting of goals for 
ourselves. The restoration of equilibrium becomes the restoration of the 
autonomy that makes us who we are. Once again the task of the healthcare 
worker in restoring equilibrium becomes the task of restoring autonomy. 
 
Autonomy in Healthcare 
Two important conclusions arise from all of this. First it is me who decides 
when to seek help. I take the first and most important decision to take my 
body to the doctor to see what is wrong and to get it fixed. When I see the 
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doctor I decide what to tell her and when I receive her advice I decide how 
much notice to take. This is not only true of the simple patient/doctor 
scenario; it remains true throughout any period of consultation and 
treatment that I may engage in as part of the attempt to restore my 
autonomy. My engagement in this process is itself an expression of my 
autonomy. At all stages of the process it is me, the person who is ill, who 
takes all of the important decisions. I am never, and never can be, a mere 
object in this process. For me to agree to become such an object, or for 
others to behave as if I am, contradicts the very purpose of my own 
enterprise in seeking help to restore my lost autonomy, and of the 
enterprise of those who offer assistance to me in this endeavour. Personal 
autonomy is vested in self-conscious subject, not in objects. Lost autonomy 
cannot be restored in a process that does not treat me as an autonomous 
subject and I will experience any such process which attempts this as self-
defeating. The contradiction that I experience is grounded in the lack of 
harmony between the extrinsic purpose of healthcare and intrinsic practice 
which contradicts this purpose. 
 
The second conclusion is that my illness is always presented and seen in 
the context of my life as a person. My illness is not separate from me; it 
occurs within the context of my lived experience (life) and is only relevant 
within that context. If the process of consultation, advice and treatment that 
I experience when I seek help tries to separate, in any way, my life from my 
illness then it has failed to understand the reason why I am seeking help in 
the first place. In medical training this is usually understood by the dictum, 
“treat the patient not the disease” and the fact that so many have to be 
reminded so often by this dictum is an indicator of how far modern 
healthcare has strayed from treating persons to making us all into patients. 
Without the context of my life my illness has no meaning, (like the ballet 
dancer with asthma). As a person who is ill I remain conceptually at the 
centre of my care. This is perhaps why it has been asked why we even need 
to specify “person centered healthcare”. We should not need to state the 
obvious and the fact that we do need to shows how far behind we are 
leaving persons in modern healthcare. 
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This leads to two simple precepts. First; that health and healthcare can 
only be understood and practiced when illness is understood in the 
context of the life of the person who is ill, and that any healthcare practice 
that attempts to separate persons from their illness is bound to fail. Even 
when we are ill we still have a life and it is always a mistake for others 
(and sometimes we ourselves) to define us by our illness. Illness may be 
an interruption in the course of our lives but it remains a part of our life. 
 Second; that healthcare is provided with the aim of restoring autonomy to 
people who have lost or are losing autonomy. This aim is not always 
realized; sometimes the loss of autonomy continues and ends in death. On 
other occasions autonomy may be partially restored and we adjust our 
willing to the new biological reality. More often than not, in the myriad of 
simple cases that we and our doctors face every day, autonomy is fully 
restored. Autonomy, or the potential for autonomy, is the way in which we 
recognize each other and ourselves as human individuals and in all cases 
the underlying aim of healthcare should be the restoration and preservation 
of the personal autonomy of the people who seek help. Healthcare that does 
not have respect for autonomy at its core cannot ever meet its own aims, 
and must forever contradict its own purpose. 
In the next chapter I will consider in more detail the relationship between 
those who seek care and those who provide it and through this the things 
that I consider to be the obstacles to person centered healthcare. 
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Chapter Four - Persons and Patients - Solicitude and the 
Person/Clinician Dialectic 
 
In this Chapter I want to have a look at the process of becoming a patient 
and remaining a person. To do this I will extend and deepen the discussion 
from Chapter Two about our relationship towards Others like ourselves. I 
will also consider the dialectical nature of the relationship between patients 
and doctors (and everyone else who treats us) and try to understand how 
this points towards the conclusion of a person centered approach to 
healthcare. Following this discussion I will offer a couple of practical 
examples of what person centered healthcare might look like in practice. 
  
Solicitude 
Heidegger describes the specific ontological relationship we have towards 
other Dasein with the term “solicitude”.122 This is different from the term 
“concern” which he uses to describe our ontological relation towards all of 
the other entities that we find in the world, for example chairs and desks, 
and different again from the way he interprets the meaning of Dasein as 
“Care” when setting out the everyday being of Dasein.123 While in English 
translation these terms are clearly distinct, their German origins give us the 
theme which connects them in Heidegger’s thought. The translations are; 
for solicitude, Fürsorge, for concern, Besorgen, and for Care, Sorge.124 All 
three terms are rooted on the same German notion of Sorge, meaning care 
in the sense that we are concerned with them in our everyday lives, of 
mattering to us, as the way in which we find ourselves necessarily and 
inextricably engaged within a world of entities and Others like ourselves. It 
is in this sense that the conception of an isolated subject makes no sense. 
We cannot conceive of ourselves as existing alone in a world without 
Others. From the German originals we see that both concern (Besorgen) 
and solicitude (Fürsorge) are manifestations of the Being of everyday 
Dasein as Care (Sorge). 
 
This means that when we are considering the relationship of solicitude that 
we have towards Others like ourselves we are doing so within the 
existential analysis of Dasein as whole. Our Being-with-Others is an aspect 
of this whole, so that “Even concern with food and clothing, and the nursing 
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of the sick body, are forms of solicitude.”125, and with direct relevance to 
the idea of person centered healthcare, “For example ‘welfare work’, as a 
factical social arrangement is grounded in Dasein’s state of Being as 
Being-with.”126 However, “With regard to its positive modes solicitude has 
two extreme possibilities.”127 The first of these takes away ‘Care’ from the 
Other it leaps in for him so that, 
 
This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is 
to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; 
he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been 
attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at 
his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude 
the Other can become the one who is dominated and dependent, 
even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from 
him.128 
 
This is a vividly reminiscent of the kind of paternalism which has historically 
been a prominent feature of healthcare. But, 
 
In contrast to this there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude 
which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him 
in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 
’care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the 
first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic 
care—that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with 
which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to 
himself in his care and to become free for it.129 
 
This sounds like what we are talking about when we talk about people who 
fall ill and who are helped to recover their independence by healthcare 
services. They become patients when they fall ill and are returned to full 
personhood by the provision of authentic care. This is the person centered 
approach that we hope will create persons who, although they may still be 
ill to some degree, are what is termed “self-managing”. 
 
In terms of an approach to the provision of healthcare, and following 
Heidegger, we appear to have two alternatives. The permanent 
objectification of the person receiving care, which will encompass all cases 
up to and including patient centered care, and which crucially fails to 
understand the primordial relationship we have with Others; and authentic 
solicitude, in which relationship the humanity (ontologically speaking) of the 
 54 
person receiving care is recognised and placed at centre stage. We call 
this person centered care. Authentic solicitude is the approach which frees 
the Other rather than seeks to dominate and the approach which is in 
accordance with the purpose and meaning of healthcare itself. 
 
A Short Digression with regard to Empathy 
Havi Carel says, “There are many terrible things about illness, the lack of 
empathy hurts most.”130  If this is the case empathy is clearly an important 
notion so, before going on to close the circle of this part of the work, a short 
digression on the subject of empathy will illustrate how Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology works in practice, and show us where the idea 
of empathy stands in relation to our understanding of illness and 
healthcare.  
 
Empathy is often seen as a key part of both effective healthcare and person 
centered healthcare and it is from this basis of solicitude that Heidegger is 
able to approach the notion of empathy. 
 
‘Empathy’ does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of 
Being-with does ‘empathy’ become possible: it gets its motivation 
from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with.131  
 
Heidegger does not expand on the notion of empathy in Being and Time, 
but the direction of travel is evident from what he has said about solicitude. 
Svenaeus, following Heidegger, says that, “Empathy in this way is a kind 
of discernment, a way of seeing what is going on in a world that we share 
with other human beings”.132 Agosta takes Heidegger’s beginning and 
provides a more extensive interpretation of empathy. He says, 
 
Optimally, in empathic receptivity one experiences a trace, a 
sample, a vicarious representation, of the other’s experience of 
suffering, joy, or indifference, so that one ‘‘gets it’’ experientially and 
emotionally as well as cognitively.133 
 
It is not simply a matter of seeing the signs of, or recognising the 
experience of the Other in ourselves, in empathy we have to “get it” 
experientially in a way separate from our deliberate and detached 
cognition. The Heideggerian interpretation thus remains distinctly 
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existential and outward looking towards the Others we find in the world. 
This means that Agosta can say that, 
 
empathy is the capacity that enables the one person to humanize 
the other individual by recognizing and acknowledging the 
possibilities for growth, transformation, healing, and recovery in the 
other.134 
 
Empathy is a capacity, or as Heidegger might have said empathetic 
behaviour is an authentic possibility of Dasein. This points us towards an 
ontological understanding of empathy as the basis for person centered 
healthcare. In empathy our fundamental relation to Others is called forth so 
that, 
 
empathy is fundamental to being with others, and its withdrawal or 
absence is a crisis that calls into question one’s relatedness to 
other individuals that renders individuals and communities 
vulnerable to breakdowns that are dreaded as much (and 
sometimes more) than death itself.135  
 
This interpretation of the nature of empathy propels us to a person centered 
approach to healthcare in that it bids us, from the depths of our being, to 
respond to those who need help. To ignore their plight becomes an act of 
denial of our own deepest ontology. The response of empathy is itself 
predicated only on the basis of Dasein’s fundamental Being-with-Others 
and the relationship of solicitude we have towards these others, so that 
being-empathetic becomes a possibility for Dasein, and an authentic 
possibility at that. In contrast a failure to show empathy can then be 
understood as a failure to respond authentically, as a failure to recognise 
the Other as Dasein or “one like me”, so that, 
 
Overlooking vicarious experience in the hermeneutic circle of 
empathy results in a misunderstanding that grasps only the 
cognitive dimension and reduces the process of empathy to an 
over-intellectualized ‘‘putting one-self in the other’s shoes.’’ While 
there is nothing wrong with ‘‘jump starting’’ empathy by imagining 
the pinches and discomforts of walking in the other’s shoes, there 
is something missing—namely, receptivity and the dimension of 
affectedness, corresponding to Befindlichkeit (state-of-mind).136 
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The response must remain personal, existential, and to some extent 
emotional. We are concerned here with what Heidegger calls state-of-mind 
and it is the way that we approach the Other that determines whether or 
not we are being empathetic rather than what we actually do. In the case 
that Havi Carel refers to two nurses treat her on separate occasions, both 
perform the required tasks to the required standards but it is the difference 
in their attitude to her, one empathetic the other not, which highlights the 
importance of empathy and it is the lack of empathy shown by one nurse 
that leaves her distressed and in tears.137 I will discuss this example again 
along with more of Carel’s work in the next chapter but the central role of 
empathy in healthcare is surely summed up by Svenaeus when he 
says,138,139 
 
Empathy is actually a capacity making the doctor more able to 
make a correct diagnosis, and also a quality of the medical meeting 
that contributes to empowering patients and improving upon their 
recovery.140  
 
This means that 
 
Patients who feel that their doctors care for them and attempt to 
understand and help them will often be satisfied even if there is 
nothing to be done, or even if the doctor does not do the right thing 
for them. This is a clear proof of how powerful the feelings of 
empathy (and the lack thereof) and the dialogues between persons 
that empathy enables (or precludes) in medicine are.141  
 
Empathetic behaviour on the part of the doctor, or nurse, promotes the 
ends of healthcare and is manifested in the person centered nature of the 
practice of the particular doctor or nurse, there is harmony between 
extrinsic purpose and intrinsic practice. In this sense of empathy, being 
empathetic in approach means being person centered in practice 
 
A lack of empathy denotes no more or less than a mistaken interpretation 
of the nature of our own Dasein and that of Others. The possibility for 
empathy is just part of who we are; it is up to us to determine how we 
respond to the empathetic impulse in our relations with the Others that we 
find ourselves inextricably bound up with in the world. We can choose to 
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be inauthentic or to endeavour to realize our authentic possibility. As 
Agosta so eloquently puts it, 
 
a special hermeneutic of empathy in the spirit of Heidegger is not 
humanism, it is a clearing for the possibility of being human; it is 
not existentialism, it is the clearing for the possibility of human 
possibility; it is not ethics, it is a clearing for respect, integrity, 
altruism, and a recognition of who is one’s neighbor that expands 
one’s humanness; it is not psychotherapy in the narrow sense, it is 
a clearing for human interrelatedness in the context of an inquiry 
into being human that unmasks inauthentic behavior and relieves 
emotional distress; it is not aesthetics, it is a clearing for the 
communicability of affect; it is not rhetoric is a clearing for being 
effective through language; it is not parenting, teaching, or 
leadership, it is a clearing for a commitment to community, making 
a difference, and improving the quality of life.142 
 
An authentic or empathetic response would be a response which fully 
recognised the ontological reality of different Others and our relations 
towards them. It may also be seen as a response which would point 
towards person centered care. On the other hand what Heidegger might 
call an “unsociable” response would be a response which was based on a 
mistaken understanding of the nature of the Other and of our own Dasein 
as Being-with-Others. This will lead us to paternalism or, even worse, a 
complete de-personalisation of care. Because of the way that the being of 
the Other is constitutive of our own being the denial of the nature of the 
Other includes a denial of our own being.  
 
While we live our everyday lives in the inauthentic modes of Dasein, 
including Being-they, we retain an understanding of authentic Dasein and 
what it means to be human, and we remember that this is the foundation 
of all of our Being, including inauthentic Being, like this, 
 
Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of 
Others belongs to it, this means that because Dasein’s Being is 
Being with, its understanding of Being already implies the 
understanding of Others. This understanding, like any 
understanding is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge 
about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which more 
than anything else makes such knowledge and acquaintance 
possible.143 
 
Or as Guignon puts it, with admirable clarity, 
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To be human in Heidegger’s view is to be a place holder in a 
network of internal relations, constituted by a public language, of 
the communal world into which Dasein is thrown.144 
 
We can choose the nature of our place-holding but we cannot choose not 
to have a place, and the place we inhabit includes Others like ourselves. I 
will return briefly to the notion of empathy later in this chapter under a 
consideration of the specific relationship between doctors and those that 
they treat and after a discussion about what happens to us when we 
become a patient. 
 
From Persons to Patients 
Something happens to us when we go and see a doctor or some other kind 
of healthcare professional. We go along as an independent thinking person 
who has made a decision to seek help with a health problem. We enter the 
room as an autonomous subject and leave, more often than not, as a 
patient. As Sayers says, 
 
When a person becomes a patient a change occurs, both in the 
way the individual regards his or her self, and in the way in which 
others regard the person. Yet, there may be no externally visible 
signs of illness and so, analogously, there could, on the face of it, 
be two apparently identical representations of the individual; the 
prior well self and the current patient self.145 
 
What is it that happens during this brief encounter? What is it about the 
nature of the encounter that changes us from being a person to being a 
patient?  
 
We may argue that the change is not permanent and when we emerge and 
go back to our normal lives we become persons again, and this may at first 
appear to be the case. In fact we are changed forever, even after the 
encounter our decisions and actions are influenced and sometimes 
dictated by what happened. We are now a patient acting on the advice of 
someone who knows better than we do about the health of our body. This 
change is exemplified vividly when the doctor becomes the patient. 
 
The category shift from person to patient is depicted by the 
description of Dontsava, a doctor, who becomes ill. She confers 
with a colleague as friends talk at a scientific meeting. "Yet having 
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confessed to being ill was like having confessed to a crime: 
immediately they had lost the key to equality they once possessed. 
By her confession she had excluded herself from the noble estate 
of medical men and transferred herself to the tax-paying, 
dependent estate of patients". She was crushed and had lost her 
former bearing.146 
 
The contrast is further illustrated when we consider the respective physical 
positions of the two participants in the encounter. It seems that where we 
are sitting can somehow help to determine our place in the relationship, 
 
Also shown, is the way in which a patient can cross the category 
gap. Oleg, a patient, helps a nurse analyse some data. He feels 
that by sitting at the nurse's table he has changed his position, 
altering his status and so leaving "his other self, the one past help, 
one of the irremediables", all behind him.147 
 
As someone who has spent more time with members of the nursing and 
medical professions not as a “patient” but as a colleague, friend and 
sometimes manager I can well appreciate the difference that Oleg is 
expressing, equally I can, to some extent, empathize with the doctor, 
Dontsava, following my translation from Health Service Manager to patient 
when I became seriously ill. Being a patient is a role to play and like any 
role we need to attend to how we play it. This means that on the other side 
the doctor or nurse is also playing a role and they too must attend to how 
they go about playing it well. Playing it well will turn out in some way to 
avoid crushing the person seeking help and to give them back something 
which they have lost. 
 
Can we be a patient and a person? 
It is not uncommon for us to divide ourselves in two when we are ill. We try 
to carry on as normal living our daily lives in spite of our illness. In the case 
of trivial and self-limiting illness this can work well, the gap between our will 
and our ability to carry it out is not large and we cope with our illness until 
it passes. In the case of serious and chronic illness this is not possible. 
Anyone who has suffered such illness knows how it disrupts and derails 
our life. This is because illness is part of our life; it becomes part of who we 
are. We cannot carry on as usual as our autonomy is progressively reduced 
by our illness. In the case of serious and chronic illness we have to accept 
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our illness and learn to live with it, this can make us even more the “patient”. 
But this cannot be the end of it because while we are being “the patient” 
we retain the possibility of still being a person, and this understanding 
importantly characterises our being-a-patient so that as Gadamer says, 
 
It can be argued that anyone who thinks of themselves simply as a 
‘case’ cannot receive proper treatment and that doctors cannot help 
anyone over a serious difficulty, or even a minor affliction when they 
do no more than simply exercise the routinized skills of their 
particular discipline. From both perspectives we are partners in a 
life-world which supports us all.148 
 
Referring back to the distinction I made in Chapter Three, between the 
involuntary loss of autonomy that we experience as a result of falling ill and 
the voluntary surrender of autonomy that we choose when we seek medical 
assistance, it is incumbent on all of us who provide and receive care to 
remember that while we are persons we have the possibility of becoming 
a patient, and once we are patients we retain the possibility of being a 
person, so that although we must play the part of patient when we seek 
help from the doctor (or other healthcare professional), they (and we) in 
turn must bear in mind that we have the possibility of not being a patient 
and, in fact, the point of our seeking help is to return to being a person. 
Doctor and patient must play different roles but their aim, the restoration of 
the personal autonomy of the one seeking help, is shared. In the same way 
as we are individuals but in a world of entities and Others so we are 
“patients”, or as Gadamer put it “cases”, while at the same time we are 
persons with our own unique life-world.  
 
How do we become Patients? 
There are a number of factors which contribute to this transformation.  
First, the doctor really does know better. After all we have only gone to the 
doctor because we can no longer deal with our illness without their help. 
Our own resources and those of our family, and perhaps our friends have 
been exhausted and we seek someone with greater resources. This is 
immediately manifested as a knowledge gap between us and our doctor 
and a relationship of unequal power. The doctor is powerful because she 
has knowledge that we, who are therefore weak, lack. In this situation and 
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for the best of reasons we assume the subordinate position of supplicant 
or patient. The danger that this relationship can become dehumanised is 
present from the start and both sides will have to take care to avoid this. In 
the end it is “Dialogue and discussion (which) serve to humanise the 
fundamentally unequal relationship that prevails between doctor and 
patient”149 From the very beginning we must all be clear as to why we all 
are in this unequal relationship and retain the readiness to see patients 
return to the world of persons. Our ability to be the authors of our own lives 
is fundamental to our being and this must not be lost in the complex 
process of treatment and the necessary but temporary suspension of this 
autonomy for the purpose of restoring what illness has taken from us. 
 
Second, there are the biological and normative understandings of illness 
which predominate in healthcare systems. We present either as machines 
which are not working properly (biological understanding) or examples 
which vary from the norm of health (normative understanding). In both 
cases we are depersonalised by the treatment we receive, treated as 
machines that have gone wrong rather than persons with a life of our own. 
Many of us are compliant in this depersonalisation because in the early 
stages, particularly of serious illness, we do not wish to face the fact that 
our body is failing. At this stage of illness we do not want to be a patient so 
we separate ourselves from our illness. It is not ourselves that we take to 
the doctor for treatment it is our illness. In this way we positively encourage 
the doctor to treat us in an impersonal way. This strategy is largely effective 
in the case of trivial and self-limiting illness but soon runs out of road if our 
illness turns out to be serious or chronic. The problem is that by the time 
that this happens we have already assumed the object role of patient and, 
as the disorientation that serious illness brings sets in, we are rendered 
unable to escape from this role. Those of us who have suffered serious and 
chronic illness will know that it is a long hard journey back to person from 
patient. In the case of chronic long term illness, from which we never 
recover, we have to learn to become people with an illness rather than 
patients. 
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Third, there is medical technology, increasingly present in modern 
healthcare systems and which brings considerable benefits to all of us 
when we are ill. However the use of medical technology goes a long way 
to depersonalise both sides of the healthcare encounter, as Gadamer says, 
 
What is important is to recognise the other in their otherness, as 
opposed, for example to the tendency towards a standardisation 
promoted by modern technology.150  
 
Technology can push us in the direction of depersonalisation and a way of 
forgetting this “otherness”. This is crucial since the recognition of this 
“otherness” is the recognition of the person being treated as someone like 
ourselves and when this is forgotten the being of both parties (doctors and 
patients) is diminished. Patients are attached to machines and seem to 
partake of the inanimate nature of the machine themselves while operators 
become part of the machine as it constitutes an extension of themselves, 
like an extra pair of mechanical hands or eyes. In this machine world 
personhood can disappear very quickly and it is hard to remain a person 
when attached by a multitude of leads and tubes to an array of machines 
that we do not understand. Healthcare professionals who allow machines 
to take away the otherness of their patients will fail in their ultimate purpose 
because it is, 
 
Only by means of such recognition can we hope to provide genuine 
guidance which helps the other find their own independent way. 
Treatment always involves a certain granting of freedom.151  
 
Fourth, there is the curative impulse. Doctors are trained to cure patients, 
or more accurately to cure their ills. Those of us who visit doctors accept 
this too, we go looking for a cure. This jointly held impulse quickly overrides 
our sense of personal autonomy and whatever sense the doctor may have 
of us as a person with our own life to lead. It is interesting to consider what 
happens in the case of hopelessly terminal illness where no cure is 
possible. In these cases we may find ourselves in a hospice (if we are 
lucky) and in this environment we find that the emphasis changes away 
from cure towards making comfortable and respecting the dignity of the 
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dying individual. The absence of the curative impulse re-focuses care on 
the person and in this way hospice care becomes notable for its person 
centered approach. In the case of chronic long term illness the situation is 
less clear. In effect each presentation to a doctor of a chronically ill patient 
presents an example of the doctor’s failure to cure and this can, in time, so 
erode the curative impulse that a more person centered relationship 
between physician and patient can develop. However where there remains 
the hope, however small, of a cure, the curative impulse in doctor and 
patient will always preserve this hope and the relationship may never go 
beyond the mechanistic. This will be further considered later in the 
discussion of the therapeutic relationship in the context of palliative care. 
 
Fifth, there is the sheer complexity of the process of diagnosis and 
treatment and the multiplicity of people who we will meet. In healthcare we 
live in an age of strangers.152 Particularly in the cases of serious and 
chronic illness, we are no longer cared for by our own well known, well 
trusted and often well-loved doctor. We are referred, or passed on, through 
a bewildering stream of Others who we do not know and who we may never 
meet again. In the complex world of sub-specialisation which characterises 
modern healthcare there is little or no chance for us to develop any kind of 
person-to-person relationship with those who care for us. We all stay in role 
throughout the process, we as patients and all the rest of them as doctor, 
nurse, radiographer, surgeon, anaesthetist etc. 
 
All five of these factors make person centered healthcare more difficult and 
contribute to the surrender of autonomy, dignity and respect that happens 
all too often when we become patients, but understanding is half the battle 
towards overcoming the tendency. 
 
The Doctor/Patient Dialectic 
It has been said that, 
 
Historically, the practice of medicine has been based on clinical 
objectivity and detachment from the patient as a person. Writing of 
the evolution of academic medicine in eighteenth century France, 
in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault positions the patient as the object 
of a clinical gaze; the type of gaze with which a botanist examines 
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plants, or an astrologer the stars. The patient thus represents a 
passive recipient, rather than an active participant in the clinical 
encounter.153 
 
We would all hope that this is now the expression of an outmoded 
paternalism, but our experience of healthcare may sometimes betray our 
hopes in this respect. 
 
I want to argue that the mistake of this kind of paternalism is that it forgets 
that, ontologically speaking, doctors and their patients form a dialectical 
unity in which the role of each validates the role of the other and which is 
fundamentally grounded in a dialogue between the two. I can only be a 
patient when I submit myself to a doctor and a doctor can only be a doctor 
when and if they have patients. This is because, 
 
the hermeneutics of medicine is grounded in the meeting between 
doctor and patient – a meeting in which the two different horizons 
of medical knowledge and lived illness are brought together in an 
interpretative dialogue for the purpose of determining why the 
patient is ill and how he can be treated.154 
 
Neither role makes any sense without the other. This means that for the 
doctor to do what I need them to do (to cure my ills) I must enable them to 
be a doctor by becoming a patient. To become a patient I must surrender 
(temporarily) some of my autonomy and submit to a relationship of unequal 
knowledge and power with my doctor. If I am unable or unwilling to do this 
the doctor cannot assume her own role and treat me. In this circumstance 
we would meet as autonomous equals which is precisely what I was trying 
to avoid when I came to the conclusion that my own resources were 
insufficient for me to cope with my illness. In order for my own needs to be 
met I must sacrifice some of my own autonomy and become a patient, 
rather than a person; all this in order to not frustrate my own aims in seeking 
help. The questions then remain; “How much of my autonomy do I need to 
sacrifice to make this relationship with my doctor work?”, and “How long 
must this impairment of my autonomy last in order for me to benefit from 
treatment?” There are clear decisions to be made about how to be a patient 
and yet remain a person this is encapsulated in the question “How shall I 
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live with my illness?” Although when I see the doctor and when I am 
receiving treatment I am without doubt a patient, it is also true that, for most 
of the time, even when I am ill, I continue with my life as a person. The only 
difference is that I am now a person who is ill. As a person I am a 
phenomenal being and as such I have my being both spatially and 
temporally, I am no kind of “thing” or fixed essence. This means that not 
only can I be person and patient without contradiction, but anyone who is 
involved with me, including the doctors and others who care for me, need 
to understand me in this way. Anyone who makes me into a patient- object 
commits a fundamental error as to the nature of my being and thereby fails 
to relate to me at all. They also deny their own humanity and 
phenomenological being and turn themselves into mere operatives in a 
system designed to fix biological machines. Personhood is the reality for 
those on both sides of the healthcare encounter, forgetting or neglecting 
this is likely to render the encounter unsatisfactory for both parties, and the 
only way to remember this reality is through authentic dialogue between 
those who seek help and those who provide care.155 
 
When I am unwell I experience this illness as a disruption of my embodied 
being. It does not make me other than what I am it merely changes the 
nature of my experience of the world, and it is to this change that the 
attention of the doctor is drawn and in particular the loss of autonomy that 
I am experiencing; the gap between what I will and what I can do. Clearly 
when I am undergoing treatment or a diagnostic examination, including 
consultation with a doctor, I will assume the position of a supplicant having 
temporarily given up some of my autonomy in the hope of receiving 
assistance from another. However on other occasions, for example when I 
am discussing treatment options, or simply trying to decide with my doctor 
whether or not I am fit enough to go home from hospital or to go back to 
work, I am a person discussing options open to me for my own life. In these 
cases I warrant the same treatment that would be granted anyone from any 
Other like myself; that is to be treated as a person. Gadamer sums up what 
we might call an authentic relationship between doctors and their patients, 
 
 66 
In all medical treatment the patient needs to receive guidance, and 
here the discussion and shared dialogue between doctor and 
patient plays a decisive role. What we can learn from this 
conception of the full realization of the doctor-patient relationship 
as it ought to prevail is that for all these forms of disturbance it is 
less case of ‘taking something away’ than of assisting in the 
process of adaptation and re-entry into the cycle of human, social, 
professional and family life.156 
 
In the treatment relationship our shared goal of restoring my autonomy is 
arrived at through authentic dialogue between two beings who, while their 
present relationship is unequal, understand themselves as ontologically 
equivalent. To lose sight of this is to lose sight of the purpose of healthcare. 
 
Wisdom 
Before going on to suggest two practical means by which this relationship 
may be realised I want to return to the notion of empathy and the relation 
between this and the ancient idea of phronesis in order to elucidate from 
the side of the doctor the way that their relationship with patients can 
actually work. 
 
As Svenaeus says, 
 
The Greek concept phronesis is famously thematized by Aristotle 
in the Nichomachean Ethics, and is usually translated as “practical 
wisdom”, as contrasted to technical skill in arts and crafts (techne), 
the knowledge of science (episteme), the theoretical wisdom of 
philosophy (sophia), and intuitive reason (nous).157 
 
This means that, 
 
Phronesis, though not a moral virtue in itself (such as courage or 
temperance), is accordingly the ability to judge the right end of 
action in a particular situation and make a wise choice.158 
 
As that quality which is required in order to do the right thing at the right 
time phronesis becomes a vital attribute of the clinical practitioner and the 
one thing that a doctor cannot lack. Once we understand the healthcare 
system as the sum of all the encounters taking place at each moment and 
in each day, the nature of the dialogue between doctors and those they 
care for becomes a primary focus for our understanding of what is going 
on. Svenaeus sums this up when he says, 
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The clinical encounter can be viewed as a coming-together of the 
two different attitudes and lifeworlds of doctor and patient – in the 
language of Gadamer, of their different horizons of understanding 
– aimed at establishing a mutual understanding, which can benefit 
the health of the ill party. Doctors (as well as representatives of 
other healthcare professions) are thus not first and foremost 
scientists who apply biological knowledge, but rather interpreters – 
hermeneuts of health and illness. Biological explanations and 
therapies can only be applied within the dialogical meeting, guided 
by the clinical understanding attained in service of the patient and 
his health.159 
 
This means that “Medical ethics cannot just be “epistemic”; it must also be 
“phronetic.””160 We can thus appreciate the familiar and everyday 
understanding of what is meant by a good doctor as one who does the right 
thing at the right time for each individual patient, this then further validates 
and re-affirms the necessity for a person centered approach, because, 
 
The phronimos – the wise man – knows the right and good thing to 
do in this specific situation; in the case of medicine we would say 
that he knows the right and good thing to do for this specific patient 
at this specific time.161  
 
Thus our everyday understanding of what it is to be a good doctor can be 
seen as grounded in fundamental ontology and the General Medical 
Council Code of Practice quoted in the introduction of this work now looks 
like a piece of the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer being applied in 
everyday medical practice. This does not mean that doctors must be 
phronetic before, or instead of, being epistemic or scientific. It does 
however mean that if they are not phronetic it will not matter how much 
scientific knowledge and understanding they have of the ailments of their 
patients, without phronesis they will be incapable of bringing their 
knowledge to bear for the benefit of those who seek their help. I will return 
to this point in a vividly practical context when I consider my own 
involvement in the East Kent Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness Project in 
Chapter Six. 
 
Finally in this Chapter I want to consider briefly two practical means through 
which the benefits of some of this philosophy can be learned and brought 
into practice, as manifestations of what it means to demonstrate person 
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centered healthcare. These are, normalising care and mutually informed 
consent. 
 
Normalising Care  
Sayers says, 
 
Normal life is characterised, for individuals, by the subjectivity of 
their experience. They are familiar with being the subject of their 
daily encounters as well as the subject of their own emotions. To a 
large extent they become the subjects of their illness. But patients, 
in some ways, may be treated as objects, dealt with by other 
people, at worst as inanimate beings, or at best as compliant 
recipients of care. They may become a part of the stage rather than 
participating as fellow actors.162 
 
The result of becoming “a part of the stage” is dependence and permanent 
loss of autonomy, whereas the mechanisms of normalising care constitute 
the process of restoring and maximising autonomy. Fortunately the move 
towards the increased use of modern communications technology, phone 
consultations, text messages and the exchange of digital images, which is 
being made to reduce demands for attendance at healthcare clinics, also 
promotes a person centered approach. This move is coincidentally 
normalising care for people who no longer need to attend a hospital or 
other clinical facility. Instead of the person who is ill (the patient) entering 
the world of the clinician, the clinician enters the world of the person who 
is unwell and needs help. In this new situation the person who is ill is not 
compelled to adopt the supplicant role of the patient and the clinician is 
forced to recognise the life of their patient beyond the bounds of this role 
(their life as a person). This serendipitous person centered approach leads 
to reduced dependence and prepares those for who it is suitable for a 
greater degree of self-management.  
 
This may sometimes come into conflict with the stringent requirement to 
ensure the safety of the patient above all things because it is seen as more 
“risky”, but it is an essential part of restoring patients to personhood. If we 
are not careful the requirement to ensure patient safety will amount to no 
more than an unacceptable restriction of the sovereign autonomy of the 
individual unless the process of healthcare is understood as the 
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preservation and maximisation of autonomy.163 There are times in a person 
centered system when it is better to respect autonomy and to remember 
what Mill says about our right to interfere in the lives of others,164 than it is 
to ensure safety. 
 
Mutually Informed Consent 
The implications of all this for the notion of informed consent could be 
radical and far reaching, and I propose to do no more than offer an 
interesting suggestion based on what has gone before in terms of 
philosophical reasoning. Under current systems consent is obtained from 
patients either formally or informally. The basis of this consent is that the 
person about to be treated is given information sufficient for them to 
understand the consequences of accepting or rejecting treatments. The 
relationship is one sided and I give or withhold my consent based on what 
I understand. There is usually very little, if any, of the dialogue which 
Gadamer sees as the core of the relationship between doctor and patient 
and this relationship therefore remains decisively unequal. The lack of 
genuine dialogue can easily lead to a situation in which refusal of consent 
results in pressure being exerted by the clinician who is both “in the know” 
and who probably has what they see to be my best interests at heart. 
Refusal to consent can also lead to doubts about my competence to decide 
for myself and in extreme cases, and particularly in the cases of minors or 
those with mental impairment; it can lead to cases being referred to the 
courts for resolution. This conflict model is discussed and effectively 
criticised by Yelovich.165 
 
Clinicians need to appreciate that the person that they are caring for may 
not make the choices that they would make for themselves, and that this 
gives them no more warrant to interfere than anyone else. If the notion of 
informed consent were to be re-cast into a notion of mutually informed 
consent in which, not only the person receiving the care is able to show 
that they understand and accept the treatment but, in addition, the person 
providing the care should be able to similarly show that they understand 
the individual circumstances of the person they are about to treat, and that 
they have taken these into account in suggesting a course of treatment. 
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They would then meet and decide as equals in a genuine hermeneutic 
dialogue. In the notion of mutually informed consent the relationship is 
equalized and becomes authentically two sided. There is no presumption 
that “doctor knows best” and the autonomy of the person receiving care is 
automatically made paramount. This would, in effect, formalize a person 
centered approach into every case of consent, and for every person. It 
would automatically short circuit the relationship of unequal power between 
doctors and their patients and return the autonomy of the patient to the 
centre of the healthcare stage where it belongs. 
 
In the next chapter I will move beyond the purely theoretical consideration 
of person centered healthcare and consider the testimony of what might 
be called a philosopher-patient, Havi Carel. In addition I will look at what 
Atul Gawande has to say in his book Being Mortal and see if there are 
lessons to be learned about person centered healthcare from the example 
of palliative or end of life care. 
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Chapter Five - Living Well and Dying Well 
 
In this chapter I want to use the very personal reflections of Havi 
Carel166and Atul Gawande167 in a discussion of living well with illness and 
of dying well. As an adjunct to this I want to show how the ontology which 
underpins person centered healthcare is revealed in the practice of end of 
life or palliative care.168 These accounts will, not surprisingly, turn out to be 
typical of what is now called holistic care, an expression more commonly 
heard in nursing circles than in those inhabited by doctors, which 
exemplifies ways of working that have really been around for much longer 
than the terms we now use to describe it. They are the ways of working 
which include not only empathy but also consideration and sympathy for 
others, respect for individuality, attending to the psychological and 
“spiritual” needs of people who are ill, and simply caring. Philosophically 
these ways of being towards people who are ill represent authentic 
solicitude in the practice of healthcare. They are perhaps most prominent 
in palliative care, but I hope to show that they are also central to the delivery 
of person centered healthcare in all sectors. 
 
Havi Carel – Illness 
Havi Carel is a philosopher in Bristol who was diagnosed eleven years ago 
with lymphangioleiomymatosis, a progressive disease which, amongst 
other things causes progressive loss of lung function leading to death. The 
condition is incurable and rare, occurring only in women and usually 
between the ages of 30 and 40 years. As a philosopher she turned to what 
she knew from her own discipline to help her to understand and live with 
her condition. She is still alive, and new treatments devised since her 
diagnosis have arrested her loss of lung function for the moment. She is 
married with a young son. 
 
In her remarkable book Illness – The Cry of The Flesh Havi Carel gives us 
a vivid account of what it is like to be seriously unwell, and above that, a 
penetrating analysis of the phenomenology of illness.169 She says, “The 
first time I couldn’t do something I felt surprise. It came as an insult.”170 This 
book itself is constituted in part as a first-hand account of the lived 
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experience of illness, it is an example of exactly the kind of thinking that 
Carel is trying to put forward and use in her analysis of the notion of illness. 
Her very vivid introductory account of falling ill and receiving a diagnosis is 
written in such a way as to make us understand how she felt, and as a way 
of showing us that this kind of account has a pivotal part to play in our 
understanding of not only her own understanding of illness, but of the 
notion of illness itself. Almost every chapter begins with an anecdote about 
her own experience of illness. If it works, if it helps us to understand what 
it is to be unwell, then her method is vindicated. The work is 
phenomenological and existential in itself, and as such makes a persuasive 
case for an existential and phenomenological understanding of illness, and 
by implication, healthcare. 
 
By beginning every chapter but one171 with an anecdote about her own 
experience of falling ill and becoming increasingly out of tune with her body, 
she prepares the ground for an explanation of the relationship between 
herself and her increasingly ill body. In fact this relationship turns out to be 
less of a separation between her conscious self and her body and more of 
a demonstration of their essential connectedness. Like Heidegger and 
Gadamer she rejects Descartes separation of mind and body in favour of 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body subject under which we are understood 
as embodied consciousness.172 This is not a reduction to materialism but 
a rejection of dualism and seeks to understand the combination of the 
materiality of the body and the mental world which we all experience, and 
which is the stuff of our ordinary experience of existing. It is by 
understanding these two as combined right from the start that the problem 
of how to join them together is avoided. Her approach is firmly rooted in the 
everyday and is constituted as an interpretation of the everyday experience 
of being ill and of receiving treatment. 
 
The work of Havi Carel suggests a person centered approach to 
healthcare, and echoing some of the points made in the previous chapter 
she says, “There are many terrible things about illness; the lack of empathy 
hurts most.”173 This is perhaps the most telling sentence in this book in the 
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way that it brings to the fore the importance we place on the ways that 
others behave towards us when we are ill. The same would apply to our 
own attitudes towards people who are disabled or just getting very old. She 
uses everyday accounts from her own experience of illness and treatment 
to illustrate much wider points. Her method is relentlessly 
phenomenological and existential, focusing wholly on the first-hand 
experience of the person who is unwell. In doing this she challenges the 
way in which all of us, not only doctors and nurses, seek to distance 
ourselves from those who are ill, disabled or ageing. In essence, our 
response all too often involves reducing the ill person to a status that we 
would find unacceptable if it were applied to us, as she says elsewhere,  
 
Health professionals often view the body as thematised and 
objectified, focusing on a particular organ or function in order to 
understand it as a medical object. But for the patient, the 
awareness of her body as an object is secondary to her subjective 
experience of receiving health care.174 
 
Once this kind of reduction is achieved we are able to treat the person who 
is ill as simply a set of biological functions which are not working properly, 
we make them into a medical object. Carel suggests that this way of 
working in healthcare has developed as a means of protecting those who 
care for us from the sheer humanity of the suffering of their patients. By 
withdrawing empathy and treating their patents as objects to be fixed, 
healthcare professionals are supposed to better able to get on with their 
job of using the plethora of technical approaches that are now available to 
them to make us well. It is probable that advances in medical technology 
have exacerbated this trend towards the dehumanisation of patients and in 
increasing the prominence of the biological understanding of illness at the 
expense of the phenomenological or personal approach. This is a mistake 
because, in an echo of Gadamer, 
 
Objectivity is seen as an ideal by many health professionals, but 
when subjected to philosophical analysis, it can be seen that 
merely relying on an objective stance is a naïve and non-
practicable ideal that ought to be replaced with a more nuanced 
understanding of intersubjectivity.175 
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Phenomenology re-humanises healthcare by returning us to the only thing 
that really matters; the person who is ill and their account of their illness. 
This approach could also be extended to others affected by the illness 
including family members and carers. By the ways that she sets out her 
account of her own illness she demands that those who are caring for her 
look on her as a person rather than as a mere patient. In terms of the way 
that we care for the sick this produces a shift from cure towards care, as 
the first hand lived account of the ill person comes to the fore. 
 
Havi Carel seeks to show how using a phenomenological approach, in 
which the first hand lived experience of the patients is placed at the heart 
of our understanding of illness, not only helps us all cope better with the 
trauma of serious illness but also enables the practitioner to be more (not 
less) effective in providing care. The more demanding one-to-one 
relationship that she is suggesting is empathetic because it rejects the 
objectification of people and their illnesses and insists that, although they 
may be patients when they are undergoing treatment, ultimately they are 
persons just like those treating them, and that they all exist as mutually 
constitutive beings. 
 
In addition she considers the relationship between people who are ill and 
those who are not and in particular the inability of those who are not ill to 
imagine what it is like for the other person who is ill. Although the character 
at the dinner she describes176 is particularly insensitive in the way he asks 
about her health and future aspirations he represents an approach which 
is not entirely exceptional. We all have difficulty in talking to and relating to 
people who are seriously ill, it reminds us of the frailty of our own healthy 
lives. Carel recognises that she cannot change the way that everyone 
thinks and acts and teaches herself  to resist the ways that other people try 
to define her as abnormal. By learning to be rude Havi Carel learns to 
protect herself from people like this by refusing their definition of her as an 
illness rather than as a person. While this creates social embarrassment it 
is better than the alternative. After all, who is perfectly healthy, and who 
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does not have some characteristic which may be defined by others as “not 
quite right”? None of us wants to be defined by others in such limited terms. 
 
In the same way that illness changes the physical geography of the world 
by making it more difficult or impossible to do some things so illness 
changes the social geography of the ill person. When we are ill we no 
longer fit into the world of healthy people, and we cannot engage in the 
same kinds of small talk about health and well-being that people who are 
well use to acquaint themselves with each other and to pass time together. 
This means that the person who is ill is steadily disbarred from participation 
in social encounters and events. In the end it just becomes too much effort 
for both the ill person and for those who are well, as she says,  
 
Well-being is the invisible context enabling us to pursue 
possibilities and engage in projects… It is not only physical 
possibility that suffers in the hands of illness. It is the ways of being 
and being-with that suffer.177 
 
When we are well we function without thinking. Most of the normal activities 
of our lives go on unconsciously and seamlessly. It is when we are ill that 
we notice the distinction between our biological body and our lived 
experience. This typically Heideggerian analysis rests on his discussion of 
the modes of being of equipment in Being and Time in which we come to 
understand the world and our place in it through our engagement with the 
entities we encounter.178  We have all experienced some loss of normal 
body function, usually temporarily, and as we get older more permanently. 
This experience, of wanting and trying to do something that we are no 
longer capable of is the experience we have when we are ill, it is a loss of 
autonomy. We experience a dysfunction between our biological body and 
our lived experience. This disruption is global because, 
 
Being ill is not just an objective constraint imposed on a biological 
body part, but a systematic shift in the way the body experiences, 
reacts and performs tasks as a whole. The change in illness is not 
local but global, not external but strikes at the heart of 
subjectivity.179 
 
 76 
It is not simply that our body is a piece of equipment or a set of tools that 
we are trying to use, and which no longer work, the body is a piece of 
equipment which cannot really be replaced and moreover, one by which 
define our very selves. In this way illness is a catastrophic failure of 
equipment like no other that we can experience; that which we had taken 
for granted is no longer available. Unlike the slow and steady loss of 
function that we all experience as we age, illness is a sudden and 
unwelcome intrusion on the habits that our body has learned and must now 
unlearn. The lesson for healthcare from Havi Carel’s Illness, and her 
subsequent work Phenomenology of Illness, is that it is the task of modern 
healthcare to help us to learn how to adapt as part of its purpose of 
enhancing and protecting our personal autonomy. Illness is a cry for person 
centered healthcare. 
 
Atul Gawande – Being Mortal 
In Being Mortal Atul Gawande examines the process of ageing, disability 
and death across a much wider perspective than does Havi Carel in Illness. 
However the similarity between the two works is unmistakable; both are 
existential in tone and in composition, both give examples which are 
moving and personal; both therefore appeal to our common humanity in 
the hope of evoking a human response to the experiences we must all have 
at some time in our lives. 
 
Atul Gawande is a surgeon and does not write from the first person 
experience of illness, nonetheless in his accounts of the illness of others, 
including his own father; he shows how these experiences propel him 
towards a person centered approach to healthcare as the only way in which 
he can help the people he cares for. In his moving and well written book 
Being Mortal he uses real examples to illustrate how different individuals 
come to terms with their own illness and mortality, in recognition of the fact 
that suffering illness and dying is something that we all have to do for 
ourselves. He also considers how they are looked after by the healthcare 
system both when this is successful in supporting their autonomy and in 
alleviating their suffering, and when it is not. The cases he sets out chart 
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the course through denial, hope and eventual reconciliation with the 
inevitable fact that we are all subject to illness and mortal. Although some 
of his stories are those of people who have been diagnosed as terminally 
ill, in many ways these people are no different to all the rest of us. We are 
all mortal; the only difference is that the people in his book have more 
definite knowledge about how and when it will end. Gawande gives us 
stories of the lives of people just like ourselves and charts their illness and 
declining health in ways that we can recognize in our own lives. He draws 
conclusions about how we might best care for people who are ill and how 
we might conduct ourselves along the uncertain course of our own lives. 
The story of Felix and Bella180 in which Felix takes over the care of his wife 
as her health declines, while at the same time coping with his own failing 
health, is familiar in our society where people live longer but not necessarily 
healthy lives. It seems that we can all learn a lesson about what really 
matters. As he says, “we all seek a cause beyond ourselves”181 and in this 
cause, whatever it might, be we each find the meaning which makes life 
worth living. Conversely the removal of “a cause” can make life not worth 
living. When we really understand ourselves as finite beings we get a 
perspective on our lives and the things that matter so that, 
 
People with serious illnesses have priorities besides simply 
prolonging their lives… Our system of technological medical care 
has utterly failed to meet these needs.182 
 
In this way we are all not unlike Socrates sitting in the cell waiting for the 
ship to return.183 He does not know exactly when the ship will return and 
when his execution will proceed, he just knows that it will, and he makes 
his choices about how to live according to the lessons he has learned in 
his long life about what makes life worth living. In Socrates case it is his life 
in Athens and his unceasing quest for knowledge and truth which are more 
important to him, more important even than his family. Our own choices 
may be different but we all have to make them for ourselves, to be the 
authors of our own lives. When we do make our choices we would like 
others to take notice.   
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As a stark reminder to all of us, Atul Gawande sets out cases in which 
people who are living independently are suddenly, through illness or 
accident, left needing help to continue with their lives.184 He is able to show 
through these case studies that a response (nursing home care) which 
takes away what remains of their independence, and which removes them 
from their own world, reduces people to objects to be cared for. By making 
permanent patients of people who have become infirm or disabled we risk 
making their lives not worth living, by taking them away from all of the little 
things that make it worth living. Sometimes, like Socrates, it may be better 
to choose a bit less safety and a bit more freedom. It is interesting that the 
practice of sending infirm or disabled people into the exile of nursing home 
care is most often confined to the elderly who, it seems, we feel have less 
life left. Ironically this somehow makes it alright to disregard the quality of 
their lives in favour of keeping them safe until they die, as Gawande says 
it is strange that, 
 
Many of the things we want for those we care for are things that we 
would adamantly oppose for ourselves because they would infringe 
upon our sense of self.185 
 
We should pay as much attention to the quality of the lives of old people 
who are infirm as we do to the quality of the lives of young people who 
become disabled. 
 
His example of the Chase Memorial Nursing Home186 and the work done 
there by Bill Thomas illustrates how having something that matters in our 
lives makes a difference not only to the quality of our lives but even to how 
long we actually live. By bringing life into the lifeless nursing home (in the 
forms of dogs, cats, birds, plants and children) Thomas revitalized the 
institution and as Gawande says, 
 
The most important finding of Thomas’s experiment wasn’t that 
having a reason to live could reduce death rates for the disabled 
elderly. The most important finding was that it was possible to 
provide them with reasons to live, period.187 
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There are lessons to be learned from the examples that Gawande sets out 
and these are the lessons that he learns for himself from his own 
experience of the illness and dying of others. As a surgeon he admits that 
he began with a very simple understanding of healthcare. He was trained 
to fix people who went wrong; he became an expert in the technical and 
almost mechanical aspects of medicine. As his career progressed the 
various professional and personal experiences that he had of illness and 
dying made him re-consider this simple perspective and to try to gain a 
deeper understanding not only of what he could do for people who are ill, 
but what these people actually want him to do for them. We see this 
movement when he says, 
 
Scientific advances have turned the process of ageing and dying 
into medical experiences, matters to be arranged by healthcare 
professionals.188 
 
He is critical of the process that has been created because, 
 
Our reluctance to honestly examine the experience of ageing and 
dying has increased the harm we inflict on people and denied them 
the basic comforts they most need. Lacking a coherent view of how 
people might live successfully all the way to their very end we have 
allowed our fates to be controlled by the imperatives of medicine, 
technology and strangers.189  
 
Whereas it is probably more true to say that, “as people’s capacities wane, 
whether through age or ill health, making their lives better often requires 
curbing our purely medical imperatives.”190 Like Socrates some of us may 
choose a shorter but more meaningful life. 
 
The Problem of Hubris 
The problem of hubris is one that the ancient Athenians would have 
recognized and one which Gawande discusses.191 The remarkable 
progress in medical science that we have experienced in our own lifetime 
has given some of us the impression, erroneous as it turns out, that all 
illness is curable. In effect we lack the wisdom to accept what we do not 
know and consider ourselves to be much more clever than we really are. It 
is in the cases of serious and terminal illness, and simply in the 
acknowledgement of our own ageing and loss of capacity, that our hubris 
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is exposed, and this is when we have to come to terms with the fact that 
we can no longer pretend that we are immortal. It is at this point that what 
we want from our healthcare system begins to change. Collectively we face 
the problem of how to create a healthcare system which helps people to 
achieve their goals within the sphere of their own capacities, I think that 
Atul Gawande, like Havi Carel, believes that the most appropriate response 
to this question is to re-establish the personal through a phenomenological 
understanding of ourselves as finite (mortal).  
 
Gawande suggests that simple things, like asking people who are ill how 
they want to live their lives, including how they want their condition to be 
managed, and then offering the kind of care which meets what they want, 
is the way to do this in practice. This is a process which sounds simple and 
obvious but is often forgotten and absent in modern technological 
healthcare. It is sad, from the examples he gives of people who can no 
longer live independently, and people who are terminally ill, that the 
imperatives of person centered care only seem to come to the fore when 
the option of restoring us to our former lives is removed. In this extreme 
circumstance healthcare has no option but to find a way to manage, as 
opposed to cure, our declining health. To do this we have to attend to the 
person and to factors which appear at first to go beyond what we 
understand by healthcare; to explore what kind of lives people want given 
the restrictions of their illness or loss of capacity. Gawande reminds us of 
the story of Ivan Ilyich,192 in which the relatives and friends of the dying 
man fail to recognize his simple human needs and it is only his servant, 
Gerasim, who can provide him with what he wants. The pity is that we still 
have not learned what Gerasim seems to know by instinct, 
 
This simple but profound service – to grasp a failing mans need for 
everyday comforts, for companionship, for help achieving his 
modest aims – is the thing that is still so devastatingly lacking more 
than a century later.193 
 
Gerasim appears to be an early practitioner of person centered healthcare, 
he understands what is happening to his master and knows what to do for 
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the best, while others either look away or scratch their heads, with no real 
idea of what to do next as the man dies before them. 
 
In the Epilogue to his book Gawande sets out the lessons that he has 
learned and which he thinks are central to the creation of a better 
healthcare system, he says, 
 
We think our job is to ensure health and survival. But really it is 
larger than that. It is to enable well-being. And wellbeing is about 
the reasons one wishes to be alive. Those reasons matter no just 
at the end of life, or when debility comes along but all along the 
way.194 
 
We are all mortal, and we all need looking after at some time or other, so 
perhaps what Atul Gawande is saying about the care of those who are 
chronically and terminally ill should apply to all of us, as we get ill and lose 
the capacity to do the things we used to do, even when we have the 
prospect of recovery from illness. He talks about how we face the great 
unfixables of mortality and death. While science has made tremendous 
advances and we can all, in western society, live longer more comfortable 
lives, the end of our lives has become a medical event. In this way it has 
been reduced to the mechanical kind of event which increasingly 
disregards the personal (or phenomenological) dimension. In common with 
Havi Carel Atul Gawande wants to re-emphasize the personal and recover 
from medical science the way we suffer illness and die, and to restore it to 
an appropriate place in the course of our living. In short he is saying that 
we should take more care to make sure that people have lives worth living 
as well as longer lives.  
 
At the end of Being Mortal Atul Gawande explicitly recognizes that the 
person centered ways of thinking about healthcare that he is putting 
forward are already present in the practice of palliative care.195 In the final 
section of this chapter I will look briefly at the principles and some of the 
practice of palliative care and try to understand what it is about palliative 
care that makes it person centered. 
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Palliative Care 
The United Kingdom General Medical Council defines palliative care as, 
 
The holistic care of patients with advanced, progressive, incurable 
illness, focused on the management of a patient’s pain and other 
distressing symptoms and the provision of psychological, social 
and spiritual support to patients and their family. Palliative care is 
not dependent on diagnosis or prognosis, and can be provided at 
any stage of a patient’s illness, not only in the last few days of life. 
The objective is to support patients to live as well as possible until 
they die and to die with dignity. 196 
 
It suggests that doctors should, 
 
give patients who are approaching the end of their life the same 
quality of care as all other patients. You must treat patients and 
those close to them with dignity, respect and compassion, 
especially when they are facing difficult situations and decisions 
about care. You must respect their privacy and right to 
confidentiality197 
 
The imperatives expressed in this guidance already beg the question as to 
why doctors should not behave like this towards all of their patients all of 
the time. 
 
There are of course clear definitions as to what constitutes “approaching 
the end of their life, (usually a prognosis of twelve months or less), but a 
more flexible interpretation would see an extension of the imperatives 
expressed in this guidance to many more of us as we age and become 
infirm. As Heidegger says, “Death is a way to be which Dasein takes over 
as soon as it is. As soon as man comes to life he is old enough to die.”198 
Heidegger is here expressing our inescapable futurity, the fact that we all 
exists as temporal and finite beings. To put it crudely, we might say that all 
of us are suffering from the terminal condition of life and we should expect, 
throughout our lives, the same kind of person centered care which is at the 
moment reserved for those close to death. 
 
It is notable that the first of six ambitions given in the Ambitions for Palliative 
and End of Life Care is that, “Each Person is seen as an individual” 199 and 
the same document says that, 
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Everybody approaching the end of their life should be offered the 
chance to create a personalised care plan. Opportunities for 
informed discussion and planning should be universal. Such 
conversations must be ongoing with options regularly reviewed.200 
 
Again, perhaps we should expect to be treated as individuals whenever we 
need healthcare. 
 
Overall, all of these entirely laudable aims and ambitions are unremarkable 
in documents setting out principles and actions for the care of people who 
know that they have not very long to live. They are all essentially first and 
foremost person centered aims and ambitions. People who are in this 
position are not to be treated as medical objects but as persons to be 
regarded as deserving considerations of dignity and choice. There is a 
clear resonance here with Heidegger’s notion of authentic solicitude which 
I set out in Chapter Four. However, and in reality, as we pass from the 
hands of those who seek to cure our illness into those who offer palliative 
care, it is all too obvious that a change occurs in the ways that we are 
regarded, albeit a welcome change. While we are ill, but have hope of 
recovery, we are too often treated as medical objects to be “cured”. Once 
curative medicine exhausts the options, those who practice it have 
nowhere to go. This is traditionally the point of referral to palliative or end-
of-life care. From this point we can now no longer be treated as the medical 
objects of curative medicine and must be treated as persons, simply 
because there is nothing else. It is ironic that we may have to wait until our 
life is nearly over until those who are caring for us begin to treat us like the 
persons that we are and that we have already been for all of our lives. The 
step from an inauthentic relationship between doctors and those they care 
for, to an authentic way of Being-with-Others comes too late, a regret which 
is sometimes expressed by those who experience palliative care and wish 
that they had been referred sooner.   
 
Being-towards-death 
The medical profession must not take all of the blame for this; the curative 
impulse is strong in all of us. We go to the doctor seeking a cure for our ills 
and, at least initially, we base our decisions about the advice that we 
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receive on the prospect of more, not less, life. We all live our everyday lives 
inauthentically and specifically with an inauthentic relationship towards our 
own demise. In short, we want a cure as much as the doctor. Heidegger 
says,  
 
As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in 
the face of death. Being-towards-the-end has the mode of evasion 
in the face of it - giving new explanations for it, understanding it 
inauthentically, and concealing it.201 
 
Death is turned into something we must fear and, “The "they" does not 
permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death.”202 It happens not 
yet and not to me. We see this realized in practice as Atul Gawande cites 
cases203 in which patients continue with increasingly unpleasant, and 
decreasingly effective, treatments, rather than shift their focus away from 
the impossible future and towards the present. Even at this stage we 
should not forget that medical objectification is a mutual collusion engaged 
in by both doctors and all of us when we are unwell. In the case of minor, 
self-limiting and curable illness we can get away with this inauthentic 
attitude towards finitude and relation towards others, at the small cost of 
the temporary loss of autonomy which being a patient entails. But when we 
are confronted with terminal or long term chronic illness we are brought 
sharply face-to-face with our own finitude, and we begin to behave as 
persons rather than as patients, and demand to be treated as such. In turn 
the healthcare system at last recognizes us as persons and begins to 
behave accordingly. 
 
It is natural that the care of the terminally ill involves a change in priorities 
in relation to the patient, because treatment designed to cure becomes 
increasingly irrelevant as the disease progresses. It is really no surprise 
that the ideas that drive practitioners in palliative care are those of respect 
for others, the primacy of the individual, the autonomy of the person who 
is unwell, the satisfaction of immediate desires and needs, and similar 
person focused notions. Things like friendship, company and immediate 
physical comfort become more and more important as the curative impulse 
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wanes. The relationship between the professional and the person who is 
ill is changed as both of their expectations as to the possible outcomes are 
changed. This new relationship not only more closely reflects their deeper 
ontological relationships (Being-with-Others and Being-towards-death) it is 
perhaps the kind of relationship we would expect to see characterize all 
contact between those who are ill and those who care for them. Palliative 
care is perhaps the most honest of all parts of medicine. By working so 
closely with the fact of death it makes no attempt to deny the inevitability 
of death and therefore engenders an authentic relationship with death and 
finitude. 
 
It appears that the kind of approach that I have been suggesting as person 
centered, throughout this work, is realized in the practice of palliative care. 
As Atul Gawande says, even if this is not cause for celebration, it is 
certainly cause for encouragement.204 By making illness, and eventually 
death itself, a medical event we make medical objects of everyone who is 
ill and dying. The visible difference between curative medicine and 
palliative care is the possibility of complete cure and the return to our lives 
as they were before. In the bleakest possible terms we might say that the 
change to palliative care is the removal of hope, but in more positive, 
realistic and authentic terms we can say that it is the beginning of the 
understanding of ourselves as finite beings which liberates us from the 
inauthentic interpretations of “the they”. Death is as Heidegger so 
decisively puts it, “that possibility which is ones ownmost, which is non-
relational and which is not to be outstripped.”205 Death is thus quite the 
most personal event in our lives as the thing which we must do alone, 
cannot transfer to another, and which cannot be avoided. In the practice of 
palliative care this is recognized and acted on. Good palliative care is 
therefore probably the most authentic kind of healthcare because it is the 
most person centered kind of healthcare. 
 
Conclusion 
Havi Carel, Atul Gawande, and even a brief look at the principles of 
palliative care bring to our attention the possibility of realizing a person 
centered approach in healthcare practice. In the final chapter of this work 
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I will look briefly at two projects, in which I have had personal involvement, 
as a manager and as a patient, which I think offer some hope that modern 
healthcare can become person centered. I hope by then that it will be clear 
how the lessons that we can learn from these examples, and from the 
philosophical approach that I have been using, can be applied in many 
other areas of healthcare. 
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Chapter Six - Conclusion 
 
In this concluding chapter I will refer briefly to two examples of a person 
centered approach in action; one from my own experience of coping with 
serious illness, and the other of implementing a large clinical effectiveness 
programme in United Kingdom General Practice. Although this is primarily 
a work of philosophy and has been therefore mainly and necessarily 
concerned with philosophical theory, my endeavour in this section will be 
show how the philosophical position which I have shown to underlie person 
centered healthcare, can be effective in the practice of commissioning and 
providing healthcare, and conversely how the philosophical ground that I 
have revealed is manifest in healthcare practice. 
 
MyStoma 
Eight years ago I underwent major surgery for the removal of my inflamed 
colon. I had suffered from ulcerative colitis for a number of years and the 
time had come to make a change. I have now had my ileostomy for eight 
years and my life is much better than it was before. As a result of my 
surgery I met other people who have a stoma and, because of my 
experience of working in the Health Service, I became their local 
spokesman. To cut a long story very short, through my involvement with 
the other ostomists (as we call ourselves) and the willing partnership with 
our local stoma care team, we have developed a new way for all of us who 
have a stoma to be at the centre of the development and improvement of 
the services we receive. This is now called the MyStoma project and I think 
it represents a successful working example of person centered healthcare. 
 
MyStoma is run jointly by East Kent Stoma Support Groups and the Stoma 
Care Service of the East Kent Hospitals Trust, with support from our 
commercial partners (Dansac, Fittleworth Medical and Salts 
Healthcare).206 The project gives a voice to people who have a stoma and 
ensures that the care that they receive reflects their own needs as 
expressed by the ostomists themselves. The aim of MyStoma is to change 
the way that people who have a stoma are involved in the development of 
the services provided to them and to put their needs and expectations at 
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the heart of all decisions made about stoma care services. We are 
developing a new model of engagement which makes the experience of 
those who have stoma the starting point for service improvements.  
 
Everything we do in MyStoma is based on the phenomenologist starting 
point that; only the person with a stoma knows what it is really like to live 
like this, the lived experience of each person with a stoma is unique. With 
this in mind we began by simply asking individual ostomists what they 
wanted from the Stoma Care Service. To focus on the experience of 
ostomists we found that it is necessary to ask only two kinds of question: 
Questions which ostomists can answer, thus avoiding questions involving 
the complexities of how services are provided, and questions which only 
Ostomists can answer, because information about their experiences is not 
available from any other source. In practical terms this means questions 
like: 
    
What do you expect from the Stoma Care service? 
What was good about the service when you                
used it? 
     What needs to be improved? 
 
By talking to people who have a stoma and listening to the stories they 
have to tell we have created a simple and clear Ostomist Agenda. The 
Agenda is at the heart of MyStoma. It is held by the ostomists and only 
someone with a stoma can add items to the agenda. Our Agenda now 
forms the basis for all service development plans for providers and 
commissioners of stoma care in East Kent. This means that for the first 
time changes in the way that services are provided will be related to the 
things that people who have a stoma have said they want. This is the 
significant change that MyStoma is bringing to stoma care in East Kent. 
 
The Agenda acts as a clear and simple reminder to stoma care 
professionals that ostomists are at the centre of everything they do. It 
ensures that the voice of the ostomist is never lost even when we are not 
present in the discussions about how care is provided. By providing a clear 
statement of the expectations of people who have a stoma the Agenda acts 
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as a proxy for the ostomist voice and enables providers and commissioners 
not only to tailor service developments to these expectations, but to clearly 
show those they care for that they are responding to their needs and 
expectations. 
The Ostomist Agenda is under constant review; it is never finished and as 
we talk to more people with a stoma, items are changed and added. Those 
who provide the service are committed to delivering the items on the 
Agenda and report regularly to the Stoma Support Groups about the 
progress they have made in delivering our agenda. Significant 
improvements have been made, in particular the establishment of post-
discharge and out-of-hours telephone support, and community based 
stoma clinics, all of which are areas of service which everyone with a stoma 
values highly, and which will help them to become more independent and 
reduce their need to use hospital based services. 
MyStoma works because we begin and end with the experience of 
Ostomists.  This has resulted in an approach which recognises clear roles 
for everyone involved, including the Ostomists, and puts their experience 
at the centre of everything we do. MyStoma ensures that Ostomist voices 
are heard and injected into the process of service change and development 
and that this is a continuing process. Beginning with a Ostomist Agenda 
based on the stories of real experiences of having a stoma, all healthcare 
professionals involved in stoma care not only have a clear statement of 
what the people they care for think is important, but MyStoma gives them 
a thread of accountability along which they can return to their patients to 
show how much of the Ostomists Agenda is being delivered, as a measure 
of their own person centered practice. By focusing on the individual 
experience of people who have a stoma MyStoma encourages Ostomists 
to come to terms with their stoma and to become more independent, thus 
reducing the demands on the service at the same time as producing higher 
levels of satisfaction with the Stoma Care Service. MyStoma is person 
centered healthcare in action. 
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The process of implementing MyStoma has not been easy (we have no 
funding and no support from our local commissioners) but, in terms of the 
underlying philosophy, the conception of MyStoma is simple. It is an 
unremittingly person centered project which proceeds from the lived 
experience of people who have a stoma, to the development of services to 
meet these expectations and needs, and then back to the experience of 
those who are on the receiving end. The process is therefore 
phenomenological, existential and hermeneutic. Everyday experience is 
used to ground the ideas for service development and these ideas are 
returned to the everyday in the form of new and improved services, which 
then produce new experiences which in turn generate more thinking about 
service provision. Or to put it another way, the everyday experience of 
ostomists is interpreted and these interpretations lead to service 
developments which are then returned to the everyday lives of ostomists. 
The first hand lived experience of the ostomists is at all times central to the 
process and no-one who is involved in the commissioning or provision of 
stoma care in East Kent can ever forget or neglect this, in this way the 
process remains person centered. The service cannot be static, it must 
ever respond to the changing needs and expectation of the ostomists. 
 
It is becoming clear that both the philosophy underlying MyStoma and the 
methodology that we have used could be extended into other areas of care. 
If we can have MyStoma then we could have MyDiabetes, MyArthritis, 
MyColitis or My anything else and, while this would go well beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it suggests that the philosophy of person centered 
healthcare could have a significant practical impact on the way that many 
people are cared for when they are ill. 
 
East Kent Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness,207,208,209 
My second example concerns a project I managed some years ago while I 
was still working as a National Health Service manager in East Kent. This 
ambitious project was an early attempt to introduce evidence based care 
into General Medical Practice. Standards were agreed in thirteen disease 
areas against evidence based clinical criteria and East Kent GPs were 
offered the opportunity to accept funding on the basis that they would meet 
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the agreed standards. This voluntary project was devised as a vehicle to 
take the evidence drawn from clinical trials and to implement it in a real life 
population. In the end the project was so successful that, within four years, 
almost all GPs in East Kent had joined and the project was used as the 
model for the UK General Practice Quality and Outcomes Framework, 
which now forms part of every GP contract in the United Kingdom.  
 
It may appear that this kind of evidence based approach is about as far 
from person centered care that we could get, but our experience in 
implementing and monitoring the project revealed a very strong person 
centered approach from the GPs, driven by their own professional pride 
and their determination to meet the agreed standards. In order to transfer 
the evidence from the strictly controlled conditions of the clinical trial to the 
complex reality of their real life patients our GPs found that they needed to 
employ a person centered approach, and to treat each patient as an 
individual with unique needs and responses. To do otherwise, to treat them 
under a purely biological or normative understanding of illness, was not 
effective in gaining their compliance with the treatments, which the GPs 
needed in order to for them to meet the standards and to quality for 
payment. This suggests that to be effective in delivering improved 
outcomes an evidence based approach needs to be person centered. 
 
GPs were allowed to choose their own means to achieve the standards in 
individual patients. This was not a project based on guidelines and the 
prescription of the process of delivering healthcare. Criteria were chosen 
based on evidence and standards agreed with representatives of the 
participants, but it was up to individual GPs to determine how they went 
about meeting the standards in their own practice populations. They were 
also allowed to remove from the audit cohort any patient meeting agreed 
terms for exceptions. These included patients who refused the necessary 
interventions (informed dissent), those who experienced adverse reactions 
to the drug treatments recommended for their condition and those with a 
supervening condition (terminal illness and short life expectancy). In this 
way the GPs were supported in making person centered judgments in 
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respect of each of their patients and allowed to retain their own professional 
discretion and autonomy in the treatment of their patients. Both of these 
turned out to be significant factors contributing to the success of the project, 
so that although the criteria were evidence based, their application to 
individual patients had to be person centered. We are reminded here of the 
case of the asthmatic ballet dancer.210 People have many reasons for 
consulting the doctor and many reasons for taking notice of the advice that 
they receive, the success of the Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness Project 
in East Kent showed that to bring the benefits of evidence into practice 
doctors need the agreement, or at least the acquiescence, of their patients 
and that this is best obtained by using a person centered approach.  
 
It is important to note that neither the GPs involved in this project nor those 
involved in its implementation were specifically promoting a person 
centered approach. Our aim was to bring clinical evidence into everyday 
practice. The person centered approach developed through practical 
necessity (the interpretation of everyday practice) in order to enable 
everyone involved in the project to bring the benefits of evidence into the 
lives of large numbers of people. This project was not driven out of a desire 
to put into practice a piece of academic philosophy but out of the desire of 
clinical professionals and Health Service Managers to do the best they 
could for people who were unwell, and to do this they developed a person 
centered approach. The value of a person centered approach was a lesson 
learned from practice, the philosophy which became manifest in the 
everyday work of the GPs came later as a lesson for future successful work 
in this area. It was only in analyzing the reasons for the success of the 
project that the importance of the underlying philosophy became 
apparent.211,212 We were operating in a phenomenological, existential and 
hermeneutic way, not because this was our pre-determined method but 
because this was the way that worked for everyone involved, including the 
recipients of care. Philosophy became manifest through everyday practice. 
 
By allowing the GPs to retain their autonomy and to act on their 
professional discretion, by modifying the application of standards based on 
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feedback from the GPs, by treating them as persons, the project allowed, 
and even encouraged, the GPs to treat their patients as persons in the 
ways that they applied the evidence. This validation of a person centered 
approach through practical necessity demonstrates how philosophy and 
practice are bound together each driving the other in a continuous process 
of development. The East Kent Primary Care Clinical Effectiveness project 
was certainly, “a complex clinical, human and moral endeavour”213, and in 
addition it was a great success. 
 
Why Person Centered Healthcare? 
In this work I have set out the ontology of person centered healthcare and 
shown how this is manifested in the practice of healthcare. I began with 
quotes from the United Kingdom Medical and Nursing codes of practice 
and I believe that the arguments that I have brought forward in this work 
show how these fine intentions, from two highly respected professional 
bodies, can be seen to be based on sound philosophical thinking. By 
establishing a philosophical basis for a person centered approach to 
healthcare for those involved in the provision and commissioning of care, I 
have provided an intellectually consistent method with which they can 
achieve their aim of giving help to those who need it and in the ways that 
they would like to have it given. 
 
I began by setting out a phenomenological existential hermeneutic 
approach based on the work of Heidegger and Gadamer and showed how 
this approach is particularly suited to an understanding of illness and 
healthcare. Using Heidegger’s work on the “problem of other minds” I set 
out the ontological and mutually dependent relationship between people 
who are ill and those who care for them, a relationship grounded in their 
mutual personhood. I then argued that the purpose of healthcare is the 
restoration, preservation or maximisation of personal autonomy and that 
any interpretation of healthcare which did not include this would be self-
defeating of the end of healthcare. While accepting that the notion of 
personal autonomy is not simple and that there are many varied and 
complex scenarios that occur every day in every healthcare system, all of 
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them, however complex and varied, conform in essence to this basic 
analysis of loss and attempted restoration of autonomy.  
 
In Chapter Four I discussed specifically the central relationship between 
clinicians and those they care for (doctors and patients) using a dialectical 
model and Heidegger’s notion of solicitude. I was then able to set out the 
barriers to person centered healthcare and to begin to suggest how these 
can be overcome.  
 
In Chapter Five I moved onto more practical aspects of person centered 
healthcare using the work of Havi Carel and Atul Gawande to show how 
the philosophical approach that I have set out can be seen and used in 
what we see as the successful practice of healthcare, and which is notable 
by its absence in what we see as unsatisfactory practice. In the examples 
provided by Gawande and Carel we see a person centered approach 
resulting in more autonomy for those who are ill, even in cases of terminal 
illness, thus demonstrating that a person centered approach best serves 
the end of healthcare. In the work of Havi Carel the philosophical ground is 
revealed alongside the account of her own first-hand experience, while in 
Atul Gawande’s work this ground gradually becomes manifest as he sets 
out the cases in his book. Both use phenomenological method to reveal 
underlying ontology in precisely the way that Heidegger recommends, and 
both produce compelling cases for person centered healthcare. The 
example of palliative care illustrates that there is at least one extant model 
of person centered care from which we can learn lessons for the 
establishment of person centered care in other areas of healthcare, as part 
of the process of restoring and maximising the autonomy of everyone who 
is in receipt of care. 
 
Finally, in this concluding chapter I have provided two examples from my 
own experience which both illustrate the benefits of a person centered 
approach for everyone involved in healthcare and show how the 
philosophical ground is revealed in effective practice.  
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